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and Japan in Manchuria. Chapters VI and VII examine the
Japanese policy of aggression, based on biased perceptions
of its strategic interests.
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When Commodore Perry peremptorily awakened Japan
from its medieval slumber, he taught Japan that a remote
island nation vas a part of the world community and that,
if it were to survive, it must embrace the world's tech-
nology and socio-political institutions.
Japan eventually adapted a more modern system of
government and administration, finance and arms; rail-
roads were built, telegraph and cable systems were in-
stalled, and diplomatic relations were opened with foreign
countries. Japan became a probationary member of the
community of nations. Japan learned not only the world's
forms of speech, the power of it's naval armadas and it's
modern armies, and the power of steam; it also learned
power politics. Japan saw that success, even survival,
in the nineteenth-century meant empire, and forthwith set
about attaining one. By the l890's it was equipped with
the par apbrern alia of a modern state. Prussia was it's
model, and soon Japan had a Prussian-trained army and a
Prussian-inspired constitution and administration.
In 189^+, quarrels with Japan's great continental
neighbor, China, led to War; and in a short and easy war
the modernized Japanese forces routed those of the decayed,

corrupt and torpid Ch'ing bureaucracy, and Japan
emerged as the major power in Asia. But in the
aftermath of the Sino-Japanese War, Japan benefited
by an advanced course of instruction in power
politics. The war originated in controversy over
control of Korea.
From prehistoric times the Japanese believed
the Korean Peninsula to be "a dagger pointed at the
heart of Japan" and, therefore, to be kept at any
cost from falling into unfriendly hands. For cen-
turies the international status of the Peninsula
had been ambiguous and, in the nineteenth-century,
China still maintained pretensions to sOVereinty
over it
.
In 1876 Japan, employing a faithful replica of
Perry's tactics, had "opened" Korea, and obtained for
itself recognition of a special sphere of interest
there
.
China would not acknowledge that Korea was no
longer in any realistic sense its tributary, and the
immediate casus belli in 189k was the Chinese effort
to reassert and strengthen shadowy dominion over it.
The Treaty of Shimonoski, which ended the war,

awarded Japan indemnity, recognized the independence
of Korea, ceded not only Formosa and the adjacent
Pescadores hut also the Liaotung Peninsula (at the
southern tip of the Chinese province of Manchuria)
3to the victor as spoils.
The map of northeast Asia shows the Liaotung
Peninsula as a barrier across Chinese access routes
to Korea. It also provides strategic dominance of
northern China. But there were uninvited guests at
the peace conference of 1895- Europeans did not wel-
come the participation of a newcomer in the "cutting
of the Chinese melon", which had yielded many succu-
lent morsels during the second half of the nineteenth-
century. Even before the meeting of the plenipoten-
tiaries at Shimonoseki, the Japanese government had
become aware of an unfriendly tripartite intervention in
the offing which would attempt to influence the peace
terms. Hard on the signing of the treaty on 23 April
1895, the Ministers of Russia, France and Germany
called at the Foreign Office in Tokyo and delivered
notes stating that the possession by Japan of the Liao-
tung Peninsula "would render illusory the independence
of Korea"; would be "a perpetual obstacle to the peace
10

of the Far East"; and "advising" that it be re-
troceded to China. Faced with the overwhelming
force, Japan could only how to this "advice", and
relinquish the coveted foothold in Manchuria in
return for an added indemnity. It had followed
the most approved pattern of imperialism of the day,
but had come on the scene too late; the empires
k
were already preempted.
Japan knew that the Tripartite Intervention had
been conceived and managed by Russia. An active
Russian imperialism in northeast Asia would bring
Japan into conflict, sooner or later, which the
Tsarist Empire unless Japan were to waive all claim
to a share in the exploitation of the continent to which
geographical propinquity and the international mores
of the day appeared to entitle it. The conflict was not
long delayed. The Sino- Japanese War demonstrated how
much more debilitated China was than the European Powers
had comprehended, and its prompt sequel was an acceler-
ated "scramble" by them for concessions and further
leases in China. The "breakup of China" was freely
spoken of, and plans for the actual, formal partitioning
were drawn in the chancelleries of Europe.
11

In the forefront of the scramble was Imperial
Russia. First, lending China the gold to pay the
Japanese indemnity, Russia procured in 1898 a
twenty-five year lease on the southern part of the
Liaotung Peninsula, the same peninsula in which, a
few short years earlier, Japan's control had been
viewed with such pious apprehension. With this
leasehold went the right to extend the Trans-
Siberian Railway across northern Manchuria to
Vladivostok, to connect it with the Liaotung terri-
tory by a new line, and to police and administer
6the railway zones .
The Boxer rebellion in 1900 brought about joint
foreign intervention in North China to rescue the
missions and nationals and protect the interests of
the treaty powers from the Xenophobic Boxers. Under
the guise of protecting its interest, Russia overran
the whole of Manchuria, established itself as de facto
sovereign, and gave every indication of intending to
remain. Tsarist penetration of Korea had also been
vigorous and determined since 1895, and by the turn
of the century it was an open secret that the ruler
of all the Russias was dreaming of a new Oriental
12

7empire -which would join his Siberian possessions.
Japan observed with dismay the unfolding of
these events. Russia, established and ascendent
in Manchuria, was an obstacle to Japan's legitimate
continental aspirations; but a Russia grasping the
Korean "dagger" was a deadly menace to the very
existence of Japan as an independent nation. As
Russia developed its Far Eastern rail net, as its
military and naval fortifications in Manchuria
proliferated, and as its political encroachments
in China and Korea became ever more widespread,





During those years Japan endeavored unremitting-
ly to reach a modus vivendi affecting recognition of
respective spheres of interest for Japan in Korea
and for Russia in Manchuria but to no avail.
In 1903, Japan began formal negotiations to
resolve the issues. Half a year of parleying was
fruitless and, at last, frustrated by Russian evasion
and obstinacy, the Japanese government on 6 February
190U broke off negotiations and severed diplomatic
relations with St. Petersburg. Japan reserved the
13

right "to take such independent action as they may
deem best to consolidate and defend their menaced
• .
.1 9position .
The devastating Japanese torpedo attack on the
Russian Pacific Squadron in the Port Arthur road-
stead began the Russo-Japanese War. Japan had acted
without warning this time, to obviate any contretemps
which might again deprive it of the fruits of a
victory fairly won. In 1902 Japan had executed the
Anglo-Japanese Alliance, by which England was induced
to back the historic policy of "splendid isolation"
for the mutual defense of their interests in China
and Korea, respectively. The alliance provided that
if either signatory should be attacked the other would
come to its aid. Japan was thus assured of being able
to deal with Russia without a repetition of the inter-
vention of 1895- If the Sino-Japanese War had been
won due to China's weakness, the Russo-Japanese was
another story. Here Japan engaged Russia on the Asian
littoral, five thousand miles across Siberia from Mos-
cow, and demolished the motley Russian Squadron under
Admiral Rodj esvenski at Tsushima on 27 May.
In the eighteen months following the attack on
14

Port Arthur, Japanese arms were victorious. In
battle after "battle Tsarist forces were driven from
southern Manchuria and from the seas. The war was
a gradual, inexorable crushing of Russian power in
the Far East: The forcing of the Yalu and the march
down the Liaotung Peninsula; the fall on New Year's
Day 1905 of Port Arthur "the most impregnable for-
tress in the world"; the battle of Mukden in March,
with a hundred thousand Russian casualties; and
culminating in the sea battle on 27-28 May in which
the ragtag Russian Fleet was annihilated. This war
was costly to both belligerents and they were content
to accept President Theodore Roosevelt's invitation
to meet at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, in September
101905, to make peace. By the Treaty of Portsmouth
Japan obtained a quitclaim to southern Liaotung (now
known as Kwantung) and to the Russian railroads and
other interests in southern Manchuria; recognition of
a virtual protectorate over Korea, and cession of the
southern half of the island of Sakhalin, across La
Perouse Strait from Japan. For the ensuing forty years,
until its defeat in the Pacific War, Japan's history




ent erpr 1 s e
.
As a result of the Russo-Japanese War, Japan
sprang, a scant half century after awakening from
feudalism, to rank as a world power. As one of
the Five Powers, Japan helped redesign the world
at Versailles and took its seat as a permanent
member of the Council of the League of Nations.
As a world power, however, Japan came into
conflict with the Western nations who possessed,
or aspired to, special interests in Asia. Follow-
ing the Russo-Japanese War, those powers had begun
to feel suspicion, not unmixed with envy, of bur-
geoning Japanese ascendancy in Manchuria and China.
Although Britain renewed and extended the alliance,
it grew perceptibly cool to Japans ' s foreign policy
and receptive to efforts, chiefly American, to re-
strain Japan.
In the United States, President Roosevelt
viewed the Japanese challenge to the Russian goliath
with his characteristic sympathy for the underdog.
Before leaving office, however, he judged it politic
to make a display of American naval might in the
Pacific and sent the "Great White Fleet" of sixteen
16

12battleships around the world, and visited Japan.
When World War I broke out soon after, the
Allies welcomed a companion in arms whose minimal
role subdued Germany's base at Ts'ingtao on the
Shantung Peninsula and whose navy drove commerce
raiders from the western Pacific, occupied the
German Carolinas , Marianas and Marshalls , and
convoyed ANZAC troops safely to Europe. They were
less happy to see Japan profit by their preoccu-
pation with the war in Europe to consolidate for it-
self a position as sovereign of China. Had China
yielded to the Japanese so-called Twenty One Demands
of 1915, it would have become a virtual economic and
political protectorate of Japans'. The Allies were
also willing for Japan to provide the bulk of the
troops, and the leadership, for the Joint Expedition-
13
ary Force to Siberia, in 1918.
Their complaisance diminished, however, after
their withdrawal in 1920, when they saw their Orient-
al ally remaining in occupation of much of the
Siberian littoral until 1922. Japan also occupied
Sakhalin until 1925 in reprisal for the Bolshevist
massacre of Japanese soldiers and civilians at Niko-
17

laievsk. By the Peace Conference of 1919, as one
of the vistors, Japan received a mandate over the
ex- German islands in the Pacific north of the
equator, and was awarded German's concessions and
Ikproperties in Shantung.
The cluster of treaties entered into at the
Washington Conference of 1921-22 was to influence
the course of Far Eastern history up to and after
the Second World War. The conference had two ob-
jectives : to rectify the new balance of power which
had advanced Japan to a position of dominance in
East Asia, and to end the naval building race by
imposing some system of limitation on the world's
chief navies. The latter goal was achieved by the
Treaty Concerning the Limitation of Naval Armament,
setting the capital ship ratio of the American,
British and Japanese navies at 5:5:3, prescribing
a limit on the size of vessels to be built, declaring
a ten year "holiday" on new construction, and freez-
ing the status quo of fortifications and naval bases
in the Paci fie
.
Rectifying the balance of power in Asia meant
restraining Japan. To this end, the Anglo-Japanese
18

Alliance had to "be terminated. The alliance was
replaced by the Four Power Treaty in which the United
States, Great Britain, France and Japan pledged
mutual respect of the rights and territories in the
Pacific area. Next, the traditional American
policy of the "Open Door" in China was to he formal-
ized by treaty. For the purpose the Nine Power Treaty
was concluded, guaranteeing the sovereignty, indepen-
dence and integrity of China and binding the signa-
tories to refrain from taking advantage of conditions
in China in order to seek special rights or privileges.
This treaty was signed by eight foreign powers
with interest in China: The United States, Great
Britain, France, Japan, Italy, Holland, Portugal and
ITBelgium and by China itself.
Japan also agreed by separate treaty to restore
to China sovereignty over the Shantung Peninsula,
which had been assigned to Japan at Versailles.
One Asiatic power had been conspicuously absent
from the Washington Conference. Russia since 1917
was the land of Bolshevism and terror, an international
outlaw, and was not invited to respectable gatherings.




ent to Russia, however, and it became necessary that
Japan regularize relations. In 1921 the question
was what to do about the Allied involvement in Siberia,
which was obviously productive only of increasing tax
bills and the mounting suspicions of Japan's late
-
allies. One school of thought believed that, rather
than entering into relations with the Soviet regime,
Japan should; support and use the Cossack Ataman
Semenov, or some of the other adventurers struggling
for supremacy in Siberia; continue or extend its
occupation of Russian territories, and permanently
exploit them. Another school advocated the opposing
view, that the Soviet state was a fact and would prove
stable and recognition should be extended to it. This
view also held that military occupation of territories
was unjustifiable, that Japanese forces should be
withdrawn, and outstanding disputes settled by nego-
tiation with the successors to the Russian Empire.
18
The latter course was adopted by the government.
As the first step in implementing this policy,
the Maritime Province of Siberia was evacuated in
October 1922, in conformity with Japan's promise
given at the Washington Conference. The resumption
20

of relations was then attempted, but meetings with
representatives of the Moscow government, or the
ephemeral Far Eastern Republic, proved abortive.
Only after the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic
was established did protracted negotiations result
in the "Basic Convention" of January 1925. Rela-
tions were resumed on the basis of Soviet reaffirm-
ation of the Treaty of Portsmouth, the granting of
coal and petroleum concessions in northern Sakhalin,
and an expression of regret for the Nikolaievsk
massacre. For a few years following the Washington
Conference, Japanese foreign policy under the
dominating personality of Baron Shidehara expressed
faithfully the Washington treaties spirit of peace-
ful intercourse, equal opportunity and the Open Door.
Domestically, since 1919, party cabinets had held
sway, and the nation seemed on the way to establish-
ing for the first time a tradition of responsible
parliamentary democracy.
This misnamed "period of normal government" did
not long continue. During, and for a time after,
the World War, Japan had experienced a great economic
boom. The war had cost it little, while offering
21

lucrative opportunities for uncontested access to
the markets of Asia which the European nations were,
for the time being, too bust to supply. Industrial-
ization of the nation and a metamorphosis of its
economy resulted in unprecedented prosperity. With
the return of peace, and the re-entry of the Western
nations into competition, the bubble burst, and to the
predictable apres-guerre restlessness was added the
economic stringency of an industrial plant with no
outlet for its product. This gave the old economic
and political urges for expansion the fresh support
of militarists, who had been unusually quiet since the
Siberian fiasco. They opposed the "weak-kneed
Shidehara diplomacy" and the threat to the national
security involved with schemes of disarmament and
advocated a "positive policy" toward China. Positive
policy or negative, both had the same objective: the
active promotion of the China trade, to develop a
market in China for Japanese goods. The disagreement
was in the means to be employed. Shidehara insisted
on allaying Chinese ill will and cultivating a true
friendship and a peaceful coexistence founded on a
sincere respect for Chinese sovereignty and territorial
22

integrity. The "posit ivists " advocated the use of
force to advance Japan's interests in China, and
• i i • M u • 2especially in Manchuria.
The positive policy won. At this time the
Nationalist Chinese forces of the Kuomintang were
tattling their way up from the south under the
captaincy of Chiang Kai-shek and were recording
much progress in their revolutionary venture of
unifying China under one government. This unifi-
cation threatened to extend to Manchuria where
Marshall Chang Tso-lin, war lord of Manchuria,
master of Peking and Japanese coadjutor, gave evi-
dence of going over to the Kuomintang. It was
apparent that this would not he compatible with the
historical goal of Japanese hegemony there. The
cry for a positive policy to counter the threat of
exclusion from Manchuria brought about installation
in Japan of a cabinet in which one of its advocates,
General Baron Tanaka, was Premier and Foreign
«• • *. 21Mini st er
.
Direct Japanese military intervention in China
began. Expeditions were dispatched to Shantung in
1927 and again in 1928, to "protect the lives and
23

property of Japanese nationals" and to warn off
the Nationalists. Chang Tso-lin was murdered in
2 21928 by the bombing of his private train.
Boycotts of Japanese goods became epidemic
throughout China and pro-Kuomintang movements
took form in Manchuria itself. Most ominous of
all, the Chinese began to build rail lines para-
lleling Japan's South Manchuria Railway, which
had been taken from Russia in 1905 and had become
"Japan's, lifeline in Manchuria". The Chinese
government was patently scheming to eradicate
Japanese influence from Manchuria. Japanese
military ambition was restive in the face of the
growing threat of China's resumption of dominion
over its territory. While events were building
up to a test in Manchuria, international relations
were ruffled by developments in other fields .
The United States Congress saw fit, in 19 2 U
,
to embody in its new Immigration Act a prohibition
on Japanese immigration into the United States.
It was an action without relevance to the attain-
ment of any American national policy. A "Gentle-
men's Agreement" of 1907, scrupulously observed,
24

had halted Japanese emigration to the United States
23for near two decades.
As with the earlier refusal of the Allied
Powers at Versailles to incorporate into the peace
treaty an affirmation of the principle of racial
equality, this could be taken by the Japanese only
as a gratuitous affront, and it was an unfortunate
blow to good relations. Pressures arose, in the
London Conference of 1930 to revise and expand the
scope of the Washington Treaty. Japan demanded a
10:10:7 ratio, but finally agreed to continuance
of the existing ratio to the end of 1936.
The eventual breakdown of the system of naval
limitations began in 1930. Military adventure was
delayed until 1931 and when it came, its agent was
the Japanese Kwantung Army, in Manchuria. Origin-
ally a garrison for the Kwantung Leased Territory
and the South Manchuria Railway Zone, this military
establishment became a corps d'elite of the Army.
It had developed a certain impatience with the
civilian government which had failed to evince
sufficient concern for Japan's prestige as a con-
tinental power. It was this institution which, on
25

18 September 1931, precipitated the Manchuria Inci-
2kdent .
The Japanese claimed that a Chinese bomb was
detonated on the tracks of the South Manchuria Rail-
way near Mukden. Whether or not it ever happened,
no one knows; but the Kwantung Army acted swiftly
in "self-defense". It burst out from the Leased
Territory and the Railway Zone to seize strategic
points
.
Mukden was placed under martial law and Chinese
garrisons were disarmed. Upon receipt of the news,
the government in Tokyo adopted a policy of non-
aggravation on the incident, and so instructed the
military authorities and the Commander in Chief of
the Kwantung Army. But it was too late; the call of
destiny which the Army was hearing drowned out the
voice of government. Fighting broke out at points
more and more distant from the locale of the original
incident
.
The Kwantung Army was swiftly reinforced and
within a few months the Chinese garrisons had been
driven from the whole of Manchuria, and Manchuria's
chief cities were occupied by Japanese forces. China
26

appealed to the League of Nations, in the first
test of that body's ability to enforce specific
25
settlement of international disputes.
The League acted, enough though in the end
it declined to use force, by dispatching to Man-
churia the famous Lytton Commission. The result
of the commission's activities was a report unani-
mously rejecting the Japanese plea of self-defense
and finding Japan guilty of aggression. When the
League Assembly voted h2 to Japan's 1 to adopt the
Lytton Commission's report, the chief Japanese rep-
resentative, Mr. Matsuoka, led Japan's delegation
26from the floor, in February 1933.
While the League had debated, an irresistable
"independence movement" had brought about the sepa-
ration of Manchuria from China and the establishment,
on March 1, 1932, of the new state of Manchukuo,
27
"the country of the Manchus".
Manchukuo was promoted to an empire in 193*+,
presided over by the "Boy Emperor" whom China had
dethroned in 1912, P'u Yi , now the Emperor K'ang Te
.
Since 1932, the Empire had expanded to include





The United States had laid down the "Stimson
Doctrine" and the League had put its imprimatur on
it. The doctrine of "nonrecognition of the fruits
of aggression", and Japan, isolated and without an
adherent, was faced with ostracism from internation-
al society. Japan gave notice of its withdrawal
29from the League, on 27 March.
In common with the other treaty powers , Japan
had the right under the Boxer Protocol to station
troops at certain points "between Peking and the sea;
a right which, unlike the other powers, it had
exercised by maintaining a considerable army in the
Peking-Tiens in area. To these Japanese North China
forces now passed the initiative. The presence of
such an army of occupation in an area traditionally
the preserve of native warlords and their armies
could not but result in collisions. Frequent inci-
dents, of attacks on Japanese troops or residents,
of destruction of Japanese property, of anti-
Japanese boycotts, occurred or were alleged, and
occasioned demands for reparation accompanied by
ultimatums entailing the withdrawal of Chinese
troops and the delegation of political authority
28

by the central government to local regimes.
As the sovereignty of the Chinese state was
thus diluted by infiltration, its territory was
taken in flank by the Kwantung Army which,
developing a marked tendency to act without
reference to the government at home, extended its
activities from Manchukuo westward into Mongolia
and even, on occasion, crossed the Great Wall to
menace Peking. "Autonomus regimes" sprouted
throughout the North China and Mongolia areas
;
dealing with these puppets, rather than with the
central government of China, the Japanese forces
extorted, in the name of "economic cooperation",
30further abdications of sovereignty."^
The Chinese reation to these phenomena was
a resurgence of nationalism which, from around
1935, enabled the National government to make
steady progress toward internal unity, while con-
firming it in a growing determination to clear all
Japanese from its soil and to resume control of the
nation. That which was uniting China was, in large
measure, the spirit of resistence to Japan.
A sense of impending doom was pervasive. In
29

Japan, in step with the developments in China, a
strong tide of chauvinism had set in after the Man-
churia Incident. Any who opposed aggrandizement
and militarism were stigmatized as "corrupt poli-
ticians" or "self financial magnates", who must be
silenced. Ready at hand as silencer was a tool of
ancient tradition in Japanese politics, assassina-
tion, now put to systematic use by militarists,
together with a heterogeneous rabble of ultranation-
alists and other fanatics. Already, in the years
between 1918 and 1932, the period of "normal govern-
ment", three premiers and assorted other public
figures had met death by violence because their views
31
were "unsatisfactory".
In the atmosphere of glorification of militarism
and force created by the successful Manchuria Inci-
dent, the Army's prestige had been so enhanced that
it was able to dictate the composition of Cabinets.
Even one of its most famous officers, General
Ugaki , was unable, in 1937, to carry out the Imperial
mandate to form a cabinet when no general could be
found willing to serve as War Minister under the
General who, in the nineteen twenties, had consented
32to a reduction in the size of the standing army.
30

In Western Europe, Hitler's star was ascending.
Japan began to move toward rapprochement with autho-




and isolation of which both were conscious after
withdrawal from the League.
The Army's traditional hostility to Russia and
affinity for Germany, the growing sympathy for the
totalitarian ideology, and admiration for the German
dictator's victories, hastened the agreement; fascism
became the national policy when Japan entered into
the Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany in November 1936,
and the Axis came into being.
The Anti-Comintern Pact was aimed ostensibly only
at halting the spread of communist ideology, but it
plainly implied military and political alliance
33against the Soviet state.
By the close of 1936, the conjunction of unrest
in China and the triumph of authoritarian principles
in Japan gave clear warning that a major venture of
aggrandizement was gestating. It was born, on 7 July
1937, at Lukouch'ao, the famous "Marco Polo Bridge",
outside Peking, to be promptly christened the "China
Affair". Through 1939 and 19^+0 Japanese gains were
31

negligible; it was a stalemate, which remained un-
broken until the China Affair became one aspect of a
"2
)
larger war on 8 December 19^1-
32

II. Background of War: Birth of a Military Nation-State
The Meiji Government returned political authority
to the Tenno in lQ6j . When the feudal period ended,
the warriors (Bushi) lost their special privileges as
a class, indeed they disappeared as a separate and dis-
tinct part of the population. The Bushi numbered about
Uo8,000 and they were given public bonds and the title
of shizoku or warrior-class. Other privileges were
cancelled. They became government officials, merchants
or farmers. In 1872, the Government introduced a con-
35
scription system to replace the Bushi class.
Men whose ideas were essentially those of the van-
ished warrior-class carried the largest share of the
burden of building the new government in Japan. They
constructed an authoritarian state that was ideally suited
for purposes of war. The whole concept of war and the
bearing of arms was changed with the fall of the Toku-
gawa shogunate and the collapse of the feudal order.
It was arranged in 1869 that the daimyo should re-
turn their estates and the lands to the Tenno and become
governors of their former land as His Majesty's officials.
In l8Tl, this system was abolished, new prefectures were
created, and new governors appointed.
3 3

Mass conscription changed a mark of social dis-
tinction and political power into a duty and an obli-
gation to the state. The system of universal male
conscription was instituted in lQj2 , and every able-
bodied male knew that the state was going to demand
that the women had to send their sons, fathers, bro-
thers, and husbands off to fight and die for the
country. Only by accident or ill fortune could one
escape this debt to the state.
A large proportion of the civilian population
contributed indirectly, as well as directly, to the
maintenance of the army. Whether workers, contractors,
businessmen, manufacturers or financiers, all had an
interest one way or another in the army and navy.
In the early years of modern Japan the army had
perhaps its best justification. The stress and strain
caused by the destruction of the feudal order and the
shift to a quasi-modern state inevitably brought in its
train dislocations which might have proved serious had
not the government controlled an army able to maintain
relative peace and order within the country during
those critical times. Japan also needed an army for pro^
tection from the threat outside its borders. For some
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time after the opening of the country there was dan-
ger that foreign arms might reduce Japan to the same
semi-colonial status that was rapidly "being forced
on China. These threats were enough to justify the
building up of an extensive armed force.
By the l880's, foreign intervention in Japanese
affairs had virtually disappeared, and the new struc




A. Emperor Deemed Sacred
The Imperial Constitution was drafted by the
Meiji Government in the name of the Tenno . The lead-
ing figure was Ito Hirobumi, who had gone to Europe
in 1883 to study constitutional law. He devoted most
of his studies to the German Constitution and was
secretly engaged in drafting the Constitution after
his return to Japan the following year. The Consti-
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tution was promulgated in February 1889-
Since the structure of the state was considered
eternal, the constitution contained no provisions for
amendment by the legislative branches. The new instru-
ment fully protected the ancient prerogatives of the
throne and those who represented it. Article One
declared, "The Empire of Japan shall be reigned over
and governed by a line of Emperors unbroken for ages
eternal". Article Three proclaimed, "The Emperor is
sacred and inviolable", while the succeeding article
declared, "The Emperor is the head of the Empire, com-
bining in himself the rights of sovereignty, and exer-
cises them according to the provisions of the present





On the one hand, the emperor was above criticism;
on the other, the legislative and executive powers
culminated in him and nothing could "be decided without
his consent or that of his personal advisors.
"Article 11. The Emperor has the supreme command
of the army and navy."
"Article 12. The Emperor determines the organiza-
tion and peace standing of the army and navy."
As the Emperor commands the army and navy, his
orders do not have to "be countersigned by any minister
of the state. Crown and government influence were fur-
ther reinforced by a series of institutions such as the
genro or elder system.
The Emperor is theoretically the supreme ruler over
the empire, but he is regarded as irresponsible for
affairs of the empire. The real responsibilities rest
with the three almost entirely independent executive
offices, the Cabinet, the Army General Staff, and the
Naval General Staff.
In the case of a disagreement between the Cabinet
and the Army General Staff, the home of militarists,
on matters of armed forces or foreign affairs, the winner
was usually the General Staff. To protest against a
37

decision made by the Cabinet, the minister of the army
resigns from his post. It brings a Cabinet crisis,
and usually resignation of the Cabinet as a body. A
new premier must find a suitable ranking army officer
as the minister of the army; but an army officer does
not generally venture to secure the post without the
backing of the General Staff. Therefore, no new Cabinet
can be formed against the will of either Staff. When
firm disagreements exist among the militarists them-
selves, they seldom hesitate to use violent means to
settle their differences.
Army men play more important roles in the Japanese
politics than navy men. The Army General Staff itself,
or a group of officers who have power to control the
Staff, acts freely on a military operation which could
endanger international relations, without any kind of
consent form, or of consultation with, the Cabinet.
Most of the Japanese foreign policies of that time were




B. Shinto Revived "by Meiji
The emperor worship idea was actually derived
from Shintoism. Shinto is not a Japanese term for
the religion. It is the Chinese equivalent of what
the Japanese call Kami no michi , meaning "the way of
39
the gods," and had come into popular usage.
The numerous Kami in the Shinto pantheon were
nebulous in character. They assumed no visible form
even where the enshrined spirit had formerly been an
extraordinary human "being. Worship consisted of a
simple ceremony of obeisance performed before a natural
object that was thought to contain a Kami, or before
40
a symbolic representation of the object.
After the Meiji Restoration Shinto became the
chief instrument with which the government sought to
win the loyalty of the people and to unify the country.
The Meiji leaders tried to make an exclusive state cult
of Shinto.
In iQQh State Shinto was officially designated
Shrine Shinto and was elevated to suprasect ar ian status,
which placed it above all other religious bodies but
removed it from competition with them. Shrine Shinto
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was assigned a number of shrines and an enlarged
priesthood and acquired a refined body of doctrine
and ceremonial practices. In the Imperial Rescript
on Education of 1890, the politico-religious doctrine
of Shrine Shinto was formally defined for use in mass
indoctrination. Japan was a divine country created
by the gods and ruled by an unbroken line of emperors
descended from the Sun Goddess. Confucian ethical
concepts of filial piety and loyalty to the family,
state, and emperor were stressed, and ceremonies based
on emperor worship became the foundation of national
morality. In the schools, the army, the navy, and
various governmental organizations, obeisance to the
emperor and shrine ritual were made compulsory, and
all Japanese, even those who subscribed to other reli-
gions, were required to register with a Shinto shrine.
As the sovereign rights of the state were accorded
the emperor, it was logical that the ministers should
be responsible to the emperor rather than to the people
The oligarchy could hardly have secured its position




C. Shinto and Nationalism
State Shinto insisted that the reigning emperor
and his ancestors were of divine origin. Throughout
the cult, the superiority of the Japanese as a race,
their divine mission in the world, and their supreme
devotion to the emperor were stressed. Japan was
pictured as an invincible nation. To reach the young
and begin their indoctrination early, Shinto rituals
were made a fundamental part of the training of every
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school child .
By an imperial edict of 1890, Japanese youth were
taught that the imperial throne was as ancient as the
very origins of heaven and earth. "Ancient and impres-
sive national beginnings, dim legends of a glorious
decline from the gods, became registered in the nation-
al conscience through the purely political device of
„42falsified historical writings.
Thus the Meiji Restoration was developing an
instrument of state capable of producing the blind loy-
alty and devotion Japan's leaders required. To the re-
formers, education meant not the development of young
minds for participation in a fuller life, but rather
the training of a technically competent citizenry to
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help build a strong state. Education, therefore, was
essentially designed as a tool for government training
of obedient subjects who would serve well in the machi-
nery of the modern state. Increasingly the schools
became a medium for teaching the people what to think
rather than how to think. Thus, Japan pioneered the
concept of utilizing the educational system for poli-
tical indoctrination. In classrooms and in army bar-
racks, young Japanese men were taught to glorify Japan's
military traditions. They came to believe that death on
the battlefield for the sake of the emperor was the most
glorious fate of man, and they also believed in the
unique virtues of a vaguely defined national system and
an even more vague Japanese spirit. Together, the gov-
ernment and army succeeded in just a few decades in
creating in the average Japanese the fanatical nation-
alism already characteristic of the upper classes, and
even more fanatical devotion to the emperor, cultivated
by historians and the Shinto creed, and fostered by the
oligarchy around the throne. Viscount Oura, Minister
of Commerce on 1908 , declared, "The majesty of our im-
perial house towers above everything else in the world,
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and we take it for granted that it is as perdurable
as heaven and earth. If it is contended that our
country needs religious faith then, in my opinion, we
must adopt the religion of imperialism, in other words,
the worship of the emperor."
43

D. Japan's "Divine Mission" and War Psychology
The title "Emperor" is a misnomer. The Japanese
do not call him emperor, "but Tenno , the Heavenly King.
They- do not class him with emperors and kings of na-
tions. He is above them all, a superior being. His
sanctity is proclaimed in all official statements, in
the national history for every school. Even great
Christian leaders educated in the West, such as the
late Inazo Nitobe, declare the ruler of Japan is "the
bodily representative of Heaven and Earth".
Japanese divinity does not stop with the Emperor
and land. The people are also a part of it. The abor-
igines of Japan were all gods and goddesses, and from
them descended the Yamato race, Seed of the Sun. All
other mortals are inferior. From the divine descent
of the Japanese people "proceeds their immeasurable
superiority to the native of other countries in courage
and intelligence".
Every Japanese is taught to believe he is more or
less a god, because he belongs to this divine Yamato
race. Young people grow up with the belief that (l)
Japan's Emperor is the only divine ruler, (2) Japan is
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the only divine land, (3) Japan's people are the only-
divine people and, therefore, Japan must be the light
of the world. A soldier who dies on the battlefield,
or a patriot who sacrifices his life for the Emperor,
automatically becomes a full god and joins the great
family of gods in the Lotus heaven. The so-called
Imperial Geneology was invented about TOO A.D., when
the Shogunate was abolished and the Emperor was re-
stored to power. All believed in the divinity of their
Emperor, their land, and their people. They claimed
world domination under the rule of their Mikado. Since
their Mikado was the only heavenly King, the logical
conclusion was that he was the only rightful ruler of
the universe, and that his army and navy were to save
the world. There should be but one sun in all the
heavens and but one ruler in all this mundane sphere.
World peace, so much desired, would be obtained only
through Japanese sovereignty. It was Japan's heaven-
ordained mission to establish "a new order in Asia",
and that was why "Japan is the only stabalizing force
in the Far East". It was the part of caution that
the Japanese modified their claims by confining them-
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selves to Asia and the Far East. But they extended
"the New Order in Asia" to "a new world order, a
stabilizing power in the Far East" to a "stabilizing
..
44power on the entire earth .
The late Yosuke Matsuoka, then chief of the
South Manchurian Railways, stated in 1931: "It is my
conviction that the mission of the Yamato race is to
prevent the human race from becoming devilish, to
rescue it from destruction and lead it to the world of
light." The late Count datura declared in the House
of Peers that the racial spirit of Japan alone could
save the world from the chaos into which it had fallen.
We have already seen the religious crusade against
foreign missionaries and Christian churches, to estab-
lish the Shintoistic idea of emperor worship as the
supreme national religion.
Politically, the democratic idea of freedom and
equality was diametrically opposed to the Japanese system
of government. The ruling class, belonging to heaven,
must be as high as the heavens above the mass of people.
No individual liberty could be allowed to disrupt this




merit, freedom of the press and freedom of speech are
as dangerous to the political organism of Japan as
poison is to human lungs. To criticize openly or
condemn the chief executive of the nation, as is done
in America, is unheard of in Japan. The practice of
strikes as part of the recognized exercise of indi-
vidual rights is regarded as an evil in the social
and economic life of the nation.
Out of this Shintoistic mysticism the Japanese
have gradually developed a peculiar psychology of war
combined with an extreme sense of patriotism. Having
been confined in their island world ever since the
creation, and their every attempt to secure a foothold
beyond the sea during all the past centuries having
been frustrated by the peoples of the mainland of Asia,
their hereditary national ambition was naturally a
military conquest overseas. Out of their wish they
developed this war-making mentality which, in turn,
45produced the proud warrior class of the Samurai.
The combinations of emotions with the elements
of remotest antiquity found in the Shinto convictions
explain the secret of the subsequent political success
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and strong nationalistic temperament. Nationalism,
like the spirit of Shinto, called into play not only
the will, but the intellect, the imagination, and
the emotions. The intellect constructs a speculative
mythology or, perhaps, a theology of nationalism.
The imagination fabricates an unseen world around the
eternal past and everlasting future of one's nation-
ality. Emotions arouse a joy and ecstasy in the
contemplation of the national god who is all-good and
all-protecting, a longing for his favors, a thankful-
ness for his benefits, and a feeling of awe and rever-
ence at the immensity of his power and wisdom. Its chief
rites are public rituals performed in the name and for
the salvation of the whole society. Thus, it is easy
to see why the ancient Shinto fostered the growth of
this phenomenon and, in a sense, became almost wholly
4. * a • + •+ + 46integrated into it as a concept.
The opening of their country to intercourse with
Western Powers brought into Japanese minds the ideas
of nationalism and patriotism which were highly developed
in the Western world. While adopting all the Western
ideas of life, they accepted chauvinism unreservedly
and gave to it the place formerly held by the idea of
loyalty to their feudal lords which prevailed in the
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days of the Shogunate.
Side by side with the Shintoistic idea of emperor
worship grew the "cult of war". With national expan-
sion as its objective, the practice of warrior worship
became almost a religion. Born and raised in that
atmosphere and educated and inculcated with the patri-
otic militarism, every Japanese had the same attitude
toward the Emperor and the Empire - to die for them
was the highest glory on earth.
Foreign Minister, Yosuke Matsuoka, stated in
January 1941, in a radio address to Japanese communities
abroad, mainly in the South Sea islands, that "...this
is not my desire alone; it is the desire of all Japanese
The ideal of the founder of our empire 'all mankind
under one roof' - should be made the ideal of all man-
kind... those ideals are interwoven into our alliance
with Germany, which is the guiding spirit of our foreign
, • „ 47policy .
Militarism and nationalism in Japan were thus in-
separable. A military nation was born, and Japan became
48
a major menace to Asia. Patriotic groups of one sort
or another kept the war spirit alive. The controlled
press kept up a steady barrage of propaganda. In
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addition, all groups and individuals suspected of harbor-
ing anti-war sentiments, or even ideas that might contain





III. The S ino- Japanese War and the Triple Intervention
The rivalry between Japan and China for the con-
trol of Korea was the central issue leading directly
to the S ino- Japanese War. The issue was presumably
settled by the Treaty of Shimonoseki of 1895 by which
both countries recognized Korea's complete independence.
But during the next decade, the same struggle for control
over Korea persisted, with Russia replacing China as
one of the challengers. This was the period in which
the leading European countries carved out concessions
and spheres of influence for themselves in China. This
movement was an outcome of their drive to maintain a
balance of power in Europe and led to Japan's involve-
ment in an alliance with Great Britain against Russia
China and Korea were the only foreign countries
which had been in contact with Japan from ancient times
Korea had been exchanging state-letters with Japan
throughout the Edo Period and sent missions to Japan to
52
celebrate the succession of the Shogun.
Diplomatic relations between the two countries,
however, had been suspended since 1811. The Meij i Gov-





The Korean king was young and his father, who held the
actual power, was a conservative dictator who followed
a policy of isolation. Korea had disputes with France and
the United States in 1866 and in 1871 respectively. When
Japan proposed a resumption of diplomatic relations,
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Korea declined. Ant i-Japanese feeling became strong
in Korea and in 1873 it refused to supply food to a
Japanese diplomatic mission in Pusan. The Japanese Gov-
ernment had to decide whether to withdraw all Japanese
residents from Korea or to open diplomatic relations by
force. The government chose the latter course. An expe-
dition was about to be sent when the return of the famous
Iwakura mission from Europe and America brought the pro-
54ject to an end
.
The Iwakura group, impressed by what it had seen in
the Occident, counseled a policy of waiting. They recog-
nized Japan's weaknesses as well as they did the strength
of the West. They knew that Japan had to proceed cautious
ly. The nation was not yet strong enough to follow the
policy of conquest and exploitation that the West was
55implementing in China.
As they were opposed to a Korean expedition, the
faction headed by Saigo Takamori, who favored the move,
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resigned from the government. Among the group which
resigned, Takamori and Eto Shimpei later died in the
rebellion, and Goto Shohiro and Itagaki Taisuke, who
had worked for the establishment of a parliament by
election. In 1874, as a sop to those who had been
disappointed in their hope to invade Korea, an expe-
dition was sent against Taiwan because of attacks
against Japanese there. The expedition won its few
skirmishes with the native population, but did not win
Japan any territory or prestige. From this small
beginning grew Japan's plans of conquest. The steady
succession of wars, all profitable, converted most
Japanese to the idea that war and militarism were not only
necessary and inevitable, but also profitable.
The Japanese mission was not received by Korea,
nor was a second one sent by the Imperial Government
in L868. Later, in 1869 and 1871, the Koreans again
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refused to have diplomatic intercourse with Japan.
In 1871, the Japanese sent a mission to negotiate a
treaty with China. The mission was successful and, on
July 29, 1871, the treaty was signed at Peking by
59Muneki Date and Li Hung-chang.
In 1875, a Japanese man-of-war engaged in a survey
53

off Kanghwa was bombarded by the Korean fortress and
returned the fire. Under these circumstances, when
Japan attempted to negotiate a treaty with Korea which
would have abolished the latter's seclusion and put
Japan's relations with that country on par with those
of China, complications immediately developed. In
1872-1873, when its envoys received rebuffs from the
arrogant Koreans, there was violent reaction in Japan.
60Japan then sought to clarify the situation. In
China the emperors of the Manchu Dynasty had rules
since 1644. The zenith of their power had been reached
in the eighteenth century but later the dynasty was
content to stay on the throne and to rule in the tra-
ditional ways without seriously facing the challenge
of modernization. For the better part of two decades
China was in a state of turmoil from the Taiping re-
bellion, which was not suppressed until 1864. The
Manchus managed to reassert their authority in the
period of the 'Tung-chih restoration' (1862-74) and
took steps towards consolidation and modernization.
They put down the great Muslim rebellions of the south-
west in the seventies and re-established their sover-




Tibet and Kor ea
.
China maintained that it possessed sovereignty over
the Korean kingdom. Not satisfied with the Korean an-
swer, Japan attempted to force the issue by following
a policy which Perry had used so successfully in Japan
in 1853. In 1875 Japan sought a treaty with Korea
through a show of naval force along the Korean coast
and through diplomatic negotiations. The mission failed;
the next year Japanese ships surveyed the Korean coast
despite gunfire from shore batteries. The Koreans
were warned that the survey was in preparation for a
military force which would support the next Japanese
62diplomatic move.
It was a bluff, but it worked. China, which had
only recently agreed to concessions in the Ryukyus as a
result of the Japanese military expedition against
Formosa, was afraid of future Japanese moves. Hence
Viceroy Li Hung-chang told the Koreans to receive the
63proposed Japanese diplomatic mission.
As a result, a treaty of amity and commerce was
64
concluded between Japan and Korea in 1876. Article
I of the treaty recognized that Korea was independent
65
and had equal rights with Japan. By this first modern
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treaty, Korea opened two ports to Japan and granted
partial extraterritorial rights to Japanese subjects.
In return, Japan recognized Korea as an independent
6 6
state enjoying the same sovereign rights as Japan.
One of the objectives of the Japanese negotiators
had been to obtain an agreement which clearly estab-
lished Korea as a country independent of Chinese or
d 7
any other foreign influence.
The treaty deserves some further observations.
Most authors concluded that by this treaty Korea
ceased to be a dependent state of China and that it
6 8prepared the way for the opening of Korea. Actually
these conclusions require certain qualifications. As
to Korea's renunciation of dependency on China, observers
based their arguments on Article I, which stipulated
"chosen being an independent state...". The treaty
was written only in Chinese and Japanese. The English
translation, cited in the above quotation, was not
authentic. The term "independent" in both the original
Chinese and Japanese texts is "tzu chu", which means
autonomous or self-governing, and was exactly the po-
litical status of Korea before the treaty, as the
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Chinese Yamen had time and again declared: "Korea,
though a dependent state of China, is completely
autonomous in her domestic politics and foreign re-
6 9lations. The same article further provided that
Korea enjoyed "the same sovereign rights as Japan".
Thus, it was asserted that since Japan was completely
independent, so was Korea.
A gradual modification of China's policy toward
Korea may be perceived by tracing the change of tone
in the Ch'ing documents during the period 1876-82.
China's noncommittal and nonint er f er ing Korea policy,
demonstrated in the early S ino- Japanese negotiations
over the Kanfwha incident in 1876, continued for a few
more years. At about the same time, however, many
Chinese officials became aware of the danger of foreign
incursions on Korea, and they advocated the adoption
* i •
7
of a new policy.
Hitherto, China had believed that Korea's isolation
7i
was a protection from both Russia and Japan. Even
after the conclusion of the treaty between Japan and
Korea in 1876, the Chinese Government did not alter
this concept. To formulate a new Korea policy, the
Chinese government would have had to modify its basic
ideas regarding dependent states, in particular the
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principle of conformity with traditional rules. It was
an axiom in Chinese administration procedure to follow
precedent, regardless of political reality. Whatever
precedent had been established during past regions
regarding Korea would continue to be observed. There-
fore, even though circumstances had changed, the policy




Korea's internal politics were complicated by its
foreign affairs. In 1863, a 12-year-old child, Koh
Chong King, succeeded to the throne under the regency
of his father, who was called the Taiwunkun. The weak
boy king, married to a girl of the powerful Min family,
remained under his father's domination until his strong-
willed queen gained control in 1873. This precipitated
a long factional strife that weakened the country. The
Yi faction led by Taiwunkun was pro-Chinese and opposed
Western ideas, while the Min faction led by the queen




In 1882, the Yi group aided by rioters unsuccess-
fully attacked both the queen and the Japanese legation.
China and Japan each sent forces to Korea to settle the
affair. Japan extracted an agreement which, in addition
to providing for an indemnity and punishment of the
guilty, gave further trade privileges to the Japanese.
To assert their sovereignty, the Chinese imprisoned the
Taiwunkun. Increasingly, the internal political affairs
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of Korea were becoming interlinked with the rivalry
74between China and Japan for Korea. Despite strong pop-
ular opposition in Japan to diplomatic negotiations, in
March 1885, Ito Hirobumi went to China to work, out a
solution with Viceroy Li Hung-chang. The two leaders
met in Tiensin and, after brief negotiations through
the good offices of the British Minister to the Chinese
Court, Harris Parkes, the treaty was signed on April 18,
7 51885. In this treaty, China and Japan agreed to with-
draw their military forces from Korea within four months,
and to notify the other party in advance should one party
find it necessary to send its troops back. This Tiensin
Treaty drove out Chinese influence and provided recip-
rocal opportunities to China and Japan alike, relative
to Korean problems. But though both countries withdrew
their forces from Korea, China continued to intervene
7 6in Korean domestic affairs.
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B. S ino- Japanese War
After the uprising of 1882, China increased its
interest in Korea. Yuan Shih-kai was sent to Seoul as
China's resident minister. China now asserted its
special position and gained control over Korean trade,
customs, and communications. The Min faction mean-
while had come to fear the Japanese and turned to China
for support, with the result that the progressive element
of the Min, with Japanese aid, seized the king in
December 1884. Yuan Shih-kai attacked with his forces
and drove out the Japanese and their conspirators. By
the subsequent treaties, Korea accepted full responsi-
bility for the affair and paid an indemnity. Despite
the fact that the treaty of Tiensin essentially recog-
nized China and Japan as equals, China continued in con-
77
trol. In 1886, Li Hung-chang threatened to dethrone
the Korean king when he sought aid from Russia against
China. England, to forestall Russian aggression, occu-
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pied Port Hamilton in south Korea for two years.
The Koreans were the immediate cause for the Sino-
Japanese strife. In March 1894, there developed in Korea




"Dong Hak Nan". An antiforeign organization known as
the Tonghaka led an uprising that the Korean government
could not suppress.
The Korean government with its small standing army
tried for months, without success, to suppress the
81
uprising. China was asked by the Korean government
for military help to suppress the uprising; so a Chinese
8 2
army was sent to Korea on June 7, 1874. The reason for
China's armed intervention to suppress the Tonghak
movement was clear. Peking wanted a new government
that would follow an absolute pro-Chinese policy rather
o
than the Min who were tending to ignore China for Russia.
Their chance came with the government appeal for military
help against the Tonghak. In the meantime, Japan, too
had been waiting to recover the lost ground of the mili-
tary revolt and the reformist abortion. Japan was not
asked to, but sent troops on the basis of the Tiensin
Treaty which, from Tokyo's viewpoint, justified interven-
84
tion because China had intervened.
China and Japan clashed sharply in Korea. At the
core of the antagonism was the struggle for control of
the Korean market. On the eve of the war, the two were
nearly equal in developing their respective Korean markets
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but the Japanese determination to monopolize the penin-
sular trade was far stronger that China's. It was the
Japanese determination, then, that was the fundamental
cause of the war.
The Japanese raised the question of the sovereignty
of Korea; this concept was not strongly impressed in
the Koreans' minds because Korea had been quiet and
alone for many centuries. At last, Japan declared war
on China on August 1, 1894, under the pretense of de-
86
siring to free Korea from the yoke of China.
The Korean Government was persuaded to sign an
alliance treaty with Japan in order to drive the Chi-
nese influence out of Korea; so an alliance treaty be-
tween Korea and Japan was concluded on August 26, 1894
The Chinese armed force was under the command of
General Sha Chih-chao; it was delighted to oblige the
government. The Japanese army, under the command of
Otori Keisuke, justified its arrival on the basis of the
Tiensin Treaty, to protect Japanese nationals in the
country. The presence of these foreign troops badly
undermined the position of the Tonghak rebels who were,
for all practical purposes, now out of the picture.





to withdraw. But Japan was the more ambitious party.
The war is best described as one between Li Hung-
chang, Viceroy of China, and Japan. Even Li's forces
were weakened by Chinese corruption, while the Japanese
had a small but well-equipped and efficient military
89
force and wholehearted national support of the war.
The Chinese expeditionary force in Korea was not
only beaten and driven out of Korea, but the Chinese
Northern Fleet was crushed in the Yellow Sea by a Japan-
ese fleet. China was forced to ask Japan for peace.
China seemed to think that Japan lacked the
strength to fight, as its government and parliament had
been divided against each other ever since the promul-
90
gation of the Constitution.
Neither Russia nor Britain expected Japan to win.
The war began in July 1894, and ended in March 1895,
with a victory for Japan, which occupied territories
as far north as the Peninsula of Liaotung. On April
17, 1895, the Shimonoseki Treaty was concluded. Its
terms were as follows:
(1) China recognized the independence of Korea,
(2) China ceded the Liaotung Peninsula, Formosa
and the Pescadore Islands to Japan,
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(3) China was to pay 200 million taels (300
million Japanese yen) to Japan as compensa-
t ion
,
(4) A S ino- Japanese treaty was to be concluded
modeled after treaties between China and
European countries.
Several days after the signing of the treaty, Russia,
France and Germany presented a note to the Japanese Gov-
ernment claiming that Japanese domination of the Liaotung
Peninsula would endanger Peiping, the Chinese capital,
and menace peace in the Far East. The fleets of the three
countries arranged a demonstration near Japan.
Russia had long been seeking an ice* free port . It
had opened a port at Vladivostok and now wished to retain
Lushun, Port Arthur, which would be impossible if Japan
92kept the Liaotung Peninsula. France was then allied
with Russia, and Germany regarded it in its interests to
keep Russia busy with an eastern policy. As a result of
pressure brought to bear by these three countries, Japan
was obliged to return the Peninsula to China and received
x
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in exchange the sum of 30 million taels (45 million yen)
.
China found difficulty in paying the compensation
and was assisted by Russia and France.
Although Japan lost the Liaotung Peninsula, the
amount of the compensation paid was more than that of all
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the private capital in Japan and was far more than the
money Japan had spent in the war. With such a huge
income, Japan was able to establish the gold standard
and most of the compensation was used to strengthen its
military power, in particular to build up the navy. New
men-of-war were ordered, mostly from Britain. The Sino-
Japanese War, therefore, resulted in the development of
Japan's economy and an increase in its military power.
Heavy industry was extended and Japanese commodities
flooded the Korean and Chinese markets. Weaving and
other industries expanded.
This war had a great effect on the power politics
in the Far East. Japan had a foothold on the mainland
of Asia; the Chinese Empire began to crumble; the Russians
decided to take a firm aggressive policy in the Far East,
and to prepare to check the Japanese advance.
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IV. The Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905
The 1895 European intervention had given a strong
stimulus to Japanese nationalism. The conviction that
Japan's destiny depended on its own material and spiri-
tual strength grew stronger in 1898 when Russia took
the Liaotung territory it had been instrumental in
forcing Japan to renounce. In 1904 public opinion in
Japan supported war with Russia when it appeared that
this was the only means of expelling Russia from Man-
churia and of assuring Japan's position as the most
94
powerful nation in northeastern Asia.
In 1895 Japan was largely an unknown quantity. Des-
pite its victory over China, it was still considered by
the Western powers a backward, semifeudal, inferior
country. Just prior to the outbreak of the war with
Russia, Japan had consolidated its position. It was
ally of Great Britain, had important and special interests
in Korea, and had obtained British and Russian recognition
of those interests. It was recognized as a world power,
and was confident enough of its own strength and ability
95
to defy Russian threats.
After forcibly removing Chinese influence from Korea
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in 1895, Japan faced a more serious antagonist, Russia.
Control of Korea and Manchuria seemed essential to the
successful exploitation of Russia's Asiatic empire.
Russia had no Pacific warm-water port, and to complete
the Trans-Siberian Railway on Russian soil would be
costly and inconvenient. Manchuria was sparsely pop-
ulated and rich in resources. Korea had a considerable
population but a hopelessly corrupt government. Both
96
seemed fair game to the Russians.
Russia had endeavored to expand toward the south
so that it could secure some non-frozen ports. It had
made war many times with Turkey in order to reach the
Mediterranean through the Balkan Peninsula but failed
because of the intervention of some European powers.
Meantime, Russia had also conquered many small states
in Central Asia; but was checked at last by the British
when it reached territory near the neighboring states
of India. The Russian plan of reaching the Indian
Ocean had to be abandoned. The other plan was to secure
97
some good outlets through the Far East.
It had been said that Japan never forgave Russia
for forcing it to hand back to China part of the fruits
of its victory in 1895. It was, however, not so much
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a question of forgiving or not forgiving. Actually,
Japan never for a moment gave up the idea that it
needed the Liaotung Peninsula, nor slackened its deter-
96
mination ultimately to acquire it. In 1895 Japan was
in no position to defy the international trio which
threatened it. There was nothing to do for the time
being but to eat humble pie and prepare for the future.
Meanwhile, it had been awarded a territory of vast stra-
tegic value, and a tremendous monetary indemnity which
went a long way towards helping it prepare for the
struggle ahead. Ten years in which to rest, consoli-
date its gains, build up its fighting forces; and, Japan
was ready to try again. When that time came it was
Russia, and Russia alone, which blocked the way to
Asiatic expansion by the way of the Liaotung Peninsula.
Russia drew China into a military alliance and
gained a right-of-way for the Trans-Siberian Railway by
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A. The Sino-Russian Treaty
In March, 1896, less than a year after the sign-
ing of the Treaty of Shimono seki , Li Hung-chang was
appointed by the Empress Dowager Tsu Hsi to journey to
St. Petersburg for the purpose of representing China
at the coronation of Russia's new Czar. He duly appeared
there in all the regalia of his office and, in June 1896,
he negotiated with Russia a secret treaty of alliance
10 L
specifically aimed at Japan.
The Li-Lobanov Treaty with Russia was to last 25
years, and provided for (1) a Rus so-Chinese military
alliance against Japan, (2) extension of the Trans-Si-
berian Railroad across Manchuria to Vladivostok under the
jurisdiction of the Russo-Chinese bank, (3) extensive
mineral, commercial, and industrial concessions in and
close to the railway right of way, (4) the railway to
be a purely Russo-Chinese concern which would automatic-
ally become Chinese property at the end of 80 years, but
could be purchased by China after 36 years, and (5) a
grant to Russia of the right to use certain Chinese ports
in the event of war.
By this treaty Russia secured a predominant influence
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in China, particularly in Manchuria and, during the
following year, by a combination of shrewd diplomacy
and an ever present threat of force, similar to that
which Japan had used formerly, it acquired a position
of paramount influence in Korea, the ind eperrttencel of"which
had been so recently declared.
Though Japanese-Russian rivalries for Korea's
control were intense, both sides were forced to make
concessions for the next few years. For example, when
General Yamagata was sent to Russia in 1896 to repre-
sent Japan at the coronation of the Russian Czar, he
suggested that Korea might be divided into two spheres
of interest with the thirty-eighth degree parallel as
the dividing line. By this arrangement Russian encroach-
ment could be kept within bounds and Japan would have
time to build up southern Korea and to solidify its
. .
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po s it ion
.
Russian Foreign Minister Lobanov rejected this
suggestion but by the Lobanov-Yamaga ta Convention of
1896, both countries reached a general understanding
which, in effect, placed them on an equal footing in
Korea. While Russia was primarily interested in Man-
churia and Japan considered Korea of special importance
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Japan was not ready for war, not yet. Instead,
it opened negotiations with Russia over the "Korean ques-
tion". There were three meetings, once each year between
1896 and 1898. The upshot was that Russia agreed that
neither would intervene in Korean domestic affairs and
that Russia would not prevent Japanese commercial or
industrial expansions in Korea. This, however, did not
mean that Russian ambitions were lessened. Russia's
field was wider but its imperialistic urges were no less.
Already, it had acquired Lushun and Talien from China as
its "reward" for making Japan restore Liaotung to the
Chinese and Russia was busy turning these ports into
bases open to the wide seas of the Western Pacific. In
1899, it furthered maritime schemes in Korea, on one hand,
by obtaining rights to Ulsan and Changj in as whaling bases;
on the other, to Masanpo and Mokpo as naval bases for an
Orient fleet. In turn, Japan acquired rights to Masan,
Kunsan and Songj in as open ports and bought Masanpo from
the Russians. Russia released Masanpo from the Korean
106government. Clearly, tension was mounting. So far,
it was a two-power antagonism confined to Korea.
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At the turn of the century the famous "Boxer Rebellion"
in China brought all the 5ig powers down upon that
country. Russia took this opportunity to send its
armies into Manchuria on the pretext of protecting the
Trans-Siberian Railroad. Once there, it did not budge
even when the "Boxer" trouble had been suppressed and there
was no reason to be there. To the contrary, it increased
both army and naval power and set up a Government-General.
This caused concern to Great Britain which, as usual,
opposed undue Russian expansion. Here was Japan's
opportunity to strengthen its hand against Russia by
enlisting the sponsorship, if not the partnership, of
Britain against the common threat. England, for its part,
preferred to have the big power vacuum in Korea filled
by Japan which was penetrating up the northern Far East
rather than Russia which was expanding southward and out
into the Pacific. The result was the Anglo- Japanese
107
Alliance of 1902.
The Boer War had shown the weaknesses of the British
military forces and Great Britain wanted to check the
expansion of Russia into China; if Russia took Manchuria,
British interests in Hong Kong, the Malay Peninsula,
108
Burma, and even India would be threatened.
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As the military forces of Great Britain were not
adequate to defend Manchuria, the desirability of an
alliance with Japan was apparent. The British had al-
ready checked the Czar of Russia in the Crimean War.
The Ang lo- Jap anese Alliance maintained peace and
the status quo in the Far East. It agreed that the
independence of Korea and China would be maintained and
the opportunity for all nations to maintain a sphere of
influence in these two countries would be kept open.
Neither country was to take aggressive action against
Korea or China, but eacil could protect 'iiteSlr own interests
if necessary. Furthermore, if either power were to become
engaged in a war the nonwarring power was to maintain
109
strict neutrality.
Although the Alliance was necessary for British
interests in the Far East, the importance of the Alliance
to Japan was much greater. The Alliance maintained that
Japan had particular interests in Korea and it insured
that, in the event of war with another European power,
110Japan could rely on Britain's neutrality and aid. This
allowed Japan a free hand in the Far East to deal with
Russia. The Alliance was of great importance to Japan.
Japan was tremendously encouraged. Now she could deal
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from a position of equality with other imperialistic
power s
.
Japanese aggressive action in Korea was not only to
gain extra territory and monopolize Korean markets and
raw materials but also to control its own domestic pro-
blems. Japan was having difficulty making the new
constitution work. On June2, 1894, the same day as the
revolt in Korea, the Japanese Diet was disSQlvedfor the
second time in six months. There were those Japanese
politicians who felt that an aggressive action leading
to the unification of all factions was the only thing
. .
Ill
that would save the new constitution.
After the S ino- Japanese War of 1894-1895, the Japan-
ese did not demobilize their troops as most nations did,
but actually increased the size of their army and navy.
Because of the triple intervention of France, Germany,
and Russia, Japan knew that it would probably have a con-
flict with a European power and, therefore, it was
necessary to bring armed forces up to the level of West-
ern powers. Japan was able to finance this expansion
with the 200 million taels indemnity it had received from
1 1 2the Chinese.
At the end of the war, five new divisions were
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created and the organization was changed so that the
cavalry, artillery, and engineers were attached inde-
113pendently to the infantry divisions.
Compulsory service in the army was increased to
twelve years - three in the active army, and then nine
years in the reserves. There were also one-year
volunteers who were able to extend their liability
while they were in school or some other occupation.
Better rifles for the infantry and guns for all artillery
batteries were secured. These were manufactured in Japan
and were of the largest type available in 1902.
Table 1
Comparative Figures of Armed114Forces in Japan ^


















Table 1 compares the forces of Japan before the Sino-
Japanese War and just before the Russo-Japanese War. It
shows the great increase of the Japanese army in the years
following the war with China.
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At the beginning of the S ino- Japanese War, the
navy was not large, but well-equipped and manned by well-
trained officers and men. The admirals directing the
fleets were also of the highest quality and Admiral
Togo's victory over the Russians in the Russo-Japanese
War proved this. The Russian Baltic fleet was all but
annihilated on May 27-28, 1905, in the Sea of Japan.
The help and influence of the British Navy was also of
significant value, for then Britannia still ruled the
waves. The huge indemnity received from the Chinese
played an important part by paying for the expansion of
the Japanese navy.
By 1904, the Japanese navy was ready. They were
now able to confront the Russians with six battleships
of 84,652 tons; eight armored cruisers totaling 111,470
tons. This was a sizeable increase in capital ships
since the S ino- Japanese War. It was a rule by 1900 that,
if possible, every part of the ship, including the hull,
the armor, the guns, and the equipment, had to come
from Japan. Since 1903, only three ships had been built
abroad. These were the Koshima, Katori and Kongo, which
were built in England.
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Japanese Naval Forces: 1894-1904 116



























The forced opening of Japan by Commodore Perry in
1853 caused the Japanese people to lose face and began
to instill a spirit of nationalism and revenge in
Japanese minds. The Meiji Restoration which followed
gave new impetus to nationalism in Japan. Although
unity was not established until the Satsuma Rebellion
was crushed in 1877, unity of purpose was strongly es-
tablished by the Meiji Restoration.
By successful wars against China and Russia (and the
Anglo- Japanese Alliance, the most important event in
foreign affairs), Japan had become recognized as a world
power
.
To maintain its status as a world power, and to
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fulfill imperialistic ambitions, government owned
monopolies in industry were started and a land tax
levied to finance them. Later these industries were
sold to the Zaibatsu, a group of powerful financial
cliques. The Zaibatsu, notable Mitsui, Mitsubushi,
Sumitomo, and Yasuda, formed great monopolies, encour-
aged and supported the modern military expansion in the
118
Far East, and kept nurturing Japan's military power.
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C. Causes of the War
The Russo-Japanese War was caused by a clash of
interests through the Russian invasion of Manchuria
and Korea and Japanese expansion in its struggle for
existence. The V&r can be traced to Russian Far-Eastern
119policy subsequent to the S ino -Japanese War.
The Russians were indeed concerned with Manchuria.
They were seeking an opportunity to further their inter-
ests, and the Boxer uprising provided it. The Boxers
had begun marauding in Manchuria too, and parts of the
railway were being torn up. The Russians found their
pretext. Count Witti, the Russian Minister of Finance,
who figured so prominently in Russian expansion in the
Far East, though an advocate of economic penetration as
a stage to absorption, writes in his memoirs that as
soon as the Boxer raids had become serious, General
Kuropatkin, the Minister of War, had told him "this will
„ 12give us our excuse for seizing Manchuria .
Early in July 1900, Russian troops drove into north
Manchuria, ostensibly to protect the railway, and soon
city after city fell to them. Thus the Russians were
participating in the Allied expedition to rescue the

legations in Peking and at the same time conducting
their private war in Manchuria with no one to check
on them. After the capture of Peking by Allied forces
and the cessation of fighting in China, the Chinese re-
quested the Russians to cease their advance in Manchuria
and withdraw their troops. The Russians replied that the
troops had to remain to preserve order which, incident-
al
ally, was no longer being disturbed except by them.
Japan and Russia agreed on May 14, 1896, that each
contracting party should recognize the other party's
right to station necessary troops in Korea to protect its
own interests. Japan and Russia made another agreement
on April 25, 1898, that both contracting parties should
122
respect the sovereignty and independence of Korea.
During the years 1900-1902, the Japanese government
acquired from the Korean government the franchise to
build several important railroads; the entire shipping
business was controlled by Japanese steamship companies.
In 1902 Karl Waeber, the former Russian Minister to the
court of the Emperor of Korea, Ko Chung, who had been a
confidential friend of the Emperor since 1896, was sent
to Korea by the Russian government to offer the Emperor
Russia's highest medal. The Japanese government insisted
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that by the Russian diplomat's influence on the Emperor,
Masnpo, a southern port of Korea, was secretly leased to
Russia as a naval base. Such rumors made the interna-
tional relations between Japan and Russia worse day by
day; only a miracle* could have prevented them from
123
clashing with armed forces.
Russia carried out its first withdrawal of troops on
October 8, 1902, but the second withdrawal scheduled on
April 1, 1903 was not carried out. On April 18, 1903,
Russia presented a new seven item demand to the Chinese
124government through its Minister, George de Placon.
With this demand, Russia tried to close Manchuria
and make China recognize it as Russian territory. This
violated the Open Door policy and the territorial inte-
grity of China. Japan, the United States, and Britain,
as well as the Chinese government, protested to Russia,
but Russia completely disregarded the protest and ad-
125
vanced to the northern frontier of Korea.
Russia's action was thought to be associated with the
increasing activity of Russian entrepreneurs over the
Yalu timber concessions in north Korea and east Manchuria.
This caused the Japanese especially grave anxiety. But
in the so-called 'new course' adopted by the tsarist
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government at various conferences between February and
August 1903, it was agreed that the Yalu enterprises
would be abandoned and that withdrawals from Manchuria
L26
would continue provided guarantees were obtained.
The Japanese Minister in China asked his government
to formulate its policy in response to the new situation
On 21 April, four of Japan's leaders discussed this
subject at Yamagata's country house at Kyoto. The prime
minister presented a draft memorandum, recommending a
solution based on Man-Kan Kokan, and proposed in dis-
cussions with Witte and Lamsdorf in 1901, to promote it
again. It also met with support from Yamagata and
127Komura
.
The steps to be taken were worked out by the cab-
inet and gave rise to some dissension. Ito and his
fellow genro, Inoue, wanted a less forceful approach to
Russia than the cabinet. An imperial conference was
called on 23 June at which Ito, Yamagata, Oyama , Matsu-
kata and Inoue represented the genro. The following
terms were approved as the basis for Japan's approach
to Russia
:
1. To preserve the independence and territorial
integrity of China and Korea and the principle




2. Japan and Russia to recognize the rights which
they possess at present in Korea and Manchuria
respectively and the measures which have to be
taken for their protection;
3. Japan and Russia to recognize mutually their
right of sending forces when they need to pre-
serve their above-mentioned interests or to repel
uprisings in these territories. Troops to be
withdrawn immediately after the object of sending
them had been achieved. Police needed for rail-
ways and the telegraphs are not covered by this;
4. Japan possesses the special right to advise and
assist Korea to carry out internal reforms. 2°
While paying lip service to the independence of China
and Korea, this statement was only a refined version of
Man -Kan KoKan. The conference, however, agreed that, when
Russia had tightened its grip on Manchuria, Japan should
take the opportunity to improve its standing in Korea.
In mid -1903, Japan offered to recognize Russia's sphere
of influence over Manchuria if Russia accepted Japan's super-
iority in Korea. Russia replied by offering Japan only
commercial and industrial supremacy in south Korea, while
north Korea would be neutralized. Although Japan rejected
this reply, Russian war preparations directed by Admiral
Alexieff, Russia's new "Viceroy of the Far East," induced
the Japanese to make new proposals offering (1) freedom of
navigation in the Korean Straits, (2) a neutral zone along
the Korean-Manchurian border, (3) railway connection between

Korean and Manchuria lines, and (4) recognition of Russian
supremacy in Manchuria in return for Russian recognition
of Japan's superior position in Korea. This and subse-
quent proposals were rejected by the Russians, who delayed
129
negotiations until Japanese patience was exhausted.
Cn February 6, as soon as it had broken diplomatic
relations, Japan joined action with Russia. Cn February 10,
the Imperial Declaration of War with Russia was proclaimed
»
130Russia declared War on Japan on the same day.
The war proceeded favorably for Japan. Cn May 1, Jap-
anese forces crossed the Yalu river, won the battles of
Liao-yang and 3ha-ho, and captured the fortress of Port
Arthur on January 2, 1905. The Japanese force then advanced
north and in army strength encountered the Russian forces
at Mukden. At this decisive battle, after inflicting over
10,000 casualties on the Russians, Japan won final victory
on March 10. At sea, too, on May 27 and 28 the Japanese
combined squadrons destroyed at Tsushima the Russian
Baltic fleet which had started east from Kronstadt on
September 11, 1904 and reached Japan in May the following




Do Stakes of War
Although the Russo-Japanese War was a Limited con-
flict in terms of objectives and geography, the conse-
quences of defeat had far different implications for each
nation. For Russia, defeat would mean only a halt to its
expansion in the Far East. For Japan, a defeat would lead
132to national disaster.
A victorious Russia would have meant continued
hegemony over Manchuria, occupation of Korea, control of
the seas around Japan, and a powerful voice in the affairs
of a weak China. Deprived of its markets on the mainland
and with a hostile power occupying, the Korean dagger pointed
at its throat and in control of the intervening waters,
Japan would have been in a perilous position. The prin-
cipal war aims of Japan, therefore, to which its diplomacy
had been directed for many years were to insure its pre-
dominance in Korea and to force Russia to vacate Manchuria
133
which it had occupied since the Boxer Rebellion of 1900.
In deciding to resort to war to achieve the political
objectives, which it had been unable to attain through
diplomatic means, Japan's military leaders faced a for-
midable task. Possessing a huge army, an ostensibly
powerful navy, and a strong economic and financial base,
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Russia Loomed as a great power feared by every nation in
Europe. Japan, on the other hand, although it had made
great strides toward developing into an industrialized
nation, was only 30 years out of feudalism, and its army
and navy had never been tested in armed conflict with a
134Western Power.
Japan's war aims were to insure its continued pre-
dominance in Korea and to force the Russians from Manchuria.
The ultimate objective of Japan's military strategy was the
destruction of Russia's army in Manchuria and its will to
continue to fight far from its base of power. Had the
Japanese Army been able to administer a crushing defeat to
the Russian Army, it is reasonable to conclude that it
could then have seized all of Manchuria and the Russian
Maritime Provinces. The remnants of the Russian Army in
Manchuria, plus the frontier and railway guards, would
135have provided little opposition to such an advance.
By 1904 Japan was prepared for war with a modem fleet
and a large well trained and well equipped army. Japan
also had the advantage of fighting close to its own
shores. Russia's war potential was theoretically greater,
but could not be readily brought into action. Eastern

Siberia and Manchuria were connected with Russia by a
single-track railroad over 4,000 miles long which had to
carry supplies, munitions and troops# So slow was the
process that only at the end of the war did Russia have
sufficient forces to achieve any local superiority. The
Russian Navy was large but antiquated, weakened by cor-
ruption, and widely scattered. Japanese ships, marksman-
ship and tactical skill proved superior.
As the Russians were massing troops on the Korean
border and strengthening their naval forces in the Far
East, Japan decided to break off negotiations. This was
done on February 6, 1904 and hostilities began two days
137later off Chemulpo in Korea.
During the war public opinion in the United States
was strongly favorable to Japan. It was believed to be
engaged in a war of self defense and its audacity in
challenging the Russian Colossus aroused great admiration.
The uniform successes of Japanese forces on land and sea,
its excellent hospital and sanitary arrangements and
humane treatment of prisoners of war all resounded to its
credit, while the stories of Russian incapacity and cor-




After Japan's naval victory near Tsushima, Foreign
Minister Komura requested President Roosevelt "directly
and on his own initiative" to invite Russia and Japan to
negotiate for peace. 3y mid June, 1905, both belligerents
had accepted the President's good offices . Cn August 10,
1905, the Peace Conference began at Portsmouth, New
139Hampshire.
Japan's position at the Portsmouth Peace Conference
was augmented by two diplomatic developments. In the first
place, President Roosevelt had warned Germany and France
that if they made a move against Japan, as they had done in
1895, he would support Japan. At the same time, he feared
that Japan's new position of dominance in the Pacific might
endanger American interests in the Philippines. He in-
structed his Secretary of War, William Howard Taft, who was
en route to the Philippines, to reach an understanding with
the Japanese Prime Minister. Taft informed Katsura that
the United States would not interfere if Japanese troops
established "sovereignty over Korea to the extent of requir-
ing that Korea enter into no foreign treaties without the
consent of Japan." In return, he sought Katsura's assur-
ances that Japan had no aggressive designs upon the
Philippines. These assurances were incorporated into the
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Taft-Katsura Agreement of July, 1905. Indirectly, at
least, the Agreement showed Japan that it would have
America 1 s sympathy at the peace conference.
A second diplomatic victory for Japan was the suc-
cessful extension and broadening of the Anglo-Japanese
Alliance. Cnly a few days after the Portsmouth Conference
began a second Anglo-Japanese Alliance was signed. The
new alliance, directed against both Russia and Germany,
was expanded to include the regions of East Asia and India.
Furthermore, a new proviso required that one of the sig-
natories automatically would come to the assistance of the
other when war resulted from an attack on these territories
by a third power. In return, Great Britain recognized Japan's
paramount political, and economic interests in Korea and
its right to take "measures of guidance control and protec-
tion" in Korea to safeguard those interests. The alliance
142
was to remain in force for ten years.
Unlike the first alliance, it contained no secret
clauses nor secret notes modifying any of its provisions.
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£. The Treaty of Portsmouth
The Japanese war strategy had been to win a quick
victory and a quick peace before Russia could mobilize
its full strength. The early victories were spectacular,
but not decisive. Japan was financially exhausted and the
foreign powers, even its ally England, would loan no more
for fear that Russia would be too severely humbled. 144 Ac-
cordingly, Japan asked President Roosevelt to intervene. -
Japan's victory destroyed Russian power in the Far
East and raised Japan to the rank of a major power. The
Treaty of Portsmouth signed in September 1905, negotiated
with the assistance of the United States gave Japan Russian
rights in the Liaotung Peninsula and sovereignty over the
southern half uf Sakhalin, with fishing rights in adjacent
waters. Japan also acquired control of the South Manchurian
Railway, and the right to station troops along the line to
protect it. Japan's rights in Korea were recognized by
the United States in 1905 and by Great Britain the same year,
when a second Anglo-Japanese alliance of broader scope was
signed. 3y an agreement in 1905 with Korea, Japan obtained
a protectorate over the country. This was followed in 1910
by a treaty of annexation, which made Korea an integral part
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of Japan. In 1908 Japan signed an agreement with the
United States to maintain the territorial integrity of
China and equality of commercial rights there. In 1911
the Anglo-Japanese alliance was renewed for ten years.
Meanwhile, Japan continued to strengthen its military and
146
naval forces. Its sphere of influence now encompassed
both Korea and I Manchuria and Japan was well along the road
toward acquiring a controlling influence over all of
Eastern Asia.
Russia was represented by Count Witte and 3aron Rosen,
while the Japanese emissaries were Takahira and Foreign
Minister Komura. Only after considerable negotiation,
during which Russia continued to reinforce its Far Eastern
armies, was a compromise reached. Roosevelt then prevailed
upon Japan to drop the indemnity request and settle for
Southern Sakhalin. Consequently, the Treaty of Portsmouth,
which was signed on September 5, 1905, provided for:
1. The recognition of Korean independence and
of the paramount political, military, and
economic interests of Japan therein.
2. The transfer to Japan of Russia's leases
and rights in Liaotung, and of the South
Manchurian Railway.
3. The withdrawal of foreign troops from Man-
churia except Japanese railway guards.
93

4. The acquisition of the southern half
of Sakhalin by Japan and of special
fishing rights in adjacent waters.
5. The noninterference by the signatories
in measures which China might take in
Manchuria for the commercial and in-
dustrial development of that area.
Japan's victory enhanced its prestige abroad and
enormously boosted its self esteem. At the peace confer-
rence, however, it failed to gain all it asked for, and the
Japanese leaders allowed their people to blame Roosevelt
and the United States rather than Japan's military and
financial exhaustion.
In 1905, after the conclusion of the Portsmouth
Treaty, Japan took over the administration of Korean
foreign policy. Korean foreign affairs, however, had not
functioned through normal diplomatic channels but had
been conducted by the Emperor himself. He negotiated with
foreign residents in Korea who, in turn, contacted their
home countries. The Japanese domination of Korean diplo-
matic affairs, therefore, was not complete. The Korean
King requested help from the United States but to no avail.
President Roosevelt had already declared that Korea was
incapable of governing itself. In July 1907, Korea
appealed to the Hague Tribunal for aid. The result was
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further tightening of the Japanese bonds
. The Korean
emperor was forced to abdicate in favor of his son, and a
new agreement increased the powers of the Japanese.
In August, 1910, Korea was formally annexed. Japan
was now ready for the next step in its plans for Asiatic
conquest. All that it needed was an opportunity, and it
lost no time in making one. In the acquisition of Korea,
Japan obtained considerably more than a foothold on the
Asiatic mainland, for the Korean peninsula is about twice
the size of New York State; it has a seventeen-hundred
mile coastline, numerous good harbors, large mineral wealth,
valuable farm lands, is exceedingly rich in undeveloped
resources; and in acquiring it Japan added fifty per cent
to the size of the imoire.
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V. Japanese Industry at the Beginning of the 20th Century
By the end of the nineteenth century Japan had acquired
sufficient industrial capital in the field of consumer
goods. Later, she took advantage of the expansion of
armaments and the Russo-Japanese War to develop a large
industry for producer's goods. The most notable charac-
teristic of this development was the disproportionate size
of the armaments industry, so that the economy became un-
149balanced as arms production outgrew other fields.
Another feature of Japanese industry at the beginning
of the twentieth century was the existence of medium and
small industries with poor technology and out dated facil-
ities. Many of them were still cottage industries. Some
were independent, such as the factories for the production
of matches, dry goods, spinning, weaving, dyeing, porcelain
and brewing while others, like the manufacturing of machines,
belonged to the larger industries. These medium or small
scale industries had insufficient facilities, inefficient
production and feudalistic labor relations. The larger
industries relied on these medium and small industries so
that Japanese industry as a whole could not be stabilized.
Labor conditions were bad, wages were low, hours were long,
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with extensive employment of women, children and semi-
feudalistic labor management. The worst position was that
of the women workers in cotton weaving, the biggest Jap-
anese industry. The miners were the worst treated male lab-
orers. The first factory law for the protection of workers
was enforced as late as 1916.
The chief source of labor power was the countryside.
Japanese agriculture in the twentieth century was still run
by small scale family labor and there was no large capital-
istic management. The small and arable fields made it
difficult for the Japanese farmer to benefit from western
methods and at the same time were the cause of surplus
labor. The overflow from the countryside was used as cheap
labor in industry. When the factories faced a depression
the workers returned to the agricultural districts where
they existed on the minimum requirements of life. ^
This situation was closely connected with the old in-
heritance law of Japan, which provided that the eldest
son or, failing a son, the eldest daughter, should in-
herit the land. Second or third sons, if they were for-
tunate, would be given some land or forest but, if the
family was poor, or if the eldest son's livelihood was
likely to be endangered by dividing the family property
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among the sons, the eldest took all and the second and
third sons became either factory or mine workers or
apprentices of a merchant. When the second and third sons
lost their jobs, it was the duty of their fathers or elder
brothers to feed them. In this way the agricultural dis-
tricts were constantly fostering labor reserves. This,
turn, brought about the impoverishment of the farmers.
Since the farmers were not major consumers, Japanese
industry had to seek overseas markets at an early stage in
its development. This was true particularly in the cotton
industry. The expansion of Japanese markets to Korea, in
competition with China, is regarded as one of the causes of
the Sino-Japanese War in 1894-95. Victory in this war made
it possible for Japan to extend its markets farther into
China. Industrial capital was thus acquired. The steel
works, for instance, developed only after Japan, by its
victory in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, gained access
to Chinese iron ore and coal, as well as control over the
steel works and related facilities in Manchuria and Korea.
Thus Japanese industry relied upon colonial expansion for
its accumulation of industrial capital. These are weak-
nesses in Japanese industry which have been in existence
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from the beginning of the twentieth century to the present.
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A. establishment of Private Capital
It can be claimed that the industrial revolution in
Japan had been achieved by the beginning of the twentieth
century, when Japan had developed from the stage of in-
dustrial capital to that of private capital. Following
the Russo-Japanese War, the accumulation of capital by con-
centrating industries was initiated. In Japan, however,
industries were mostly on a medium or small scale. In
1914, factories with less than ninety-nine workers made
up as much as 96 percent of Japanese industry. Factories
with more than five hundred workers accounted for only 0.7
percent, but the total number of these large factories made
up as much as 25 percent since they had under them many small
153factories of low productivity.
With regard to the establishment of financial capital,
the nationalization of railways in 1906 should be mentioned.
Some 31 percent of the mileage of Japanese railways had been
under government control and the remaining 69 percent under
private ownership. But with most of the railways in Japan
nationalized, the value of railways rose considerably and
the banks, the largest stockholders of private railways,
gained huge Drofits. The amalgamation of banks also was
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accelerated in order to consolidate the controlling power
in hands of the banks.
In due course, the powerful financial cliques grad-
ually established themselves as zaibatsu, the most not-
able being the Mitsui and Mitsubishi. The Mitsui family
had laid the foundation of its success in the seventeenth
century. The family had once owned a pawn-shop and a
brewery in Ise, and also some land a It opened a clothing
shop in Edo and then in Osaka and began to accumulate
capital by operating money exchanges in Edo, Osaka and Kyoto.
Then the family acquired new lands and became the owners of
large estates. In the Meiji Restoration the Mitsui family
gave financial aid to government and was later rewarded by
155being allowed to buy the Miike Coal Mine in Kyushu. Mitsui
ran many tributary businesses, including warehouses, spin-
ning, paper and sugar mills, all based on the large profits
which came from banking, mining and foreign trade.
Mitsubishi had its foundation in shipping, which was
first organized under government protection by Iwasaki
Yataro after the Meiji Restoration. Mitsubishi monopolized
military transportation in the rebellion of Saigo Takamori.
It also received, free of charge, thirty-one vessels from
the government.Thus the family became the center of
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Japanese marine transportation and established the Nippon
Yusen Kaisha. It gained profits from the wars with China
and Russia.
Sumitomo Zaibatsu established itself early in the
seventeenth century in the copper mining industry* After
the Meiji Restoration it modernized the Bessi Copper Mine
and began to extend its interests to coal mining, copper
refining, iron works, banking, foreign trade, warehousing,
the silk industry, camphor production and electric lines.
Sumitomo thus became the third largest concern in Japan
next to Mitsui and Mitsubishi.
Yasuda Zaibatsu also appeared after the Meiji Res-
toration. It expanded through banking, especially by con-
trolling local banks through the Yasuda Bank which was
established after the Russo-Japanese War. It also operated
in the fields of insurance, railways and electrical appar-
atus.
With the development of these zaibatsu, Japanese
capital expanded into Korea, Manchuria, China and Formosa.
The South Manchuria Railway Company, in particular, estab-
lished in 1906 after taking over the rights from Russia,
was a combination of Mitsui and Mitsubishi interests. The
company which became the center of Japanese domination in
Manchuria also controlled the Anshan Iron Works and the
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Fushun Coal Mines. Ckura zaibatsu operated the Penchifu
Coal and Iron Company. All these were indispensable to
the establishment of a steel industry to be used for
Japan's military purposes. *• °
The economic metamorphosis within Japan during the
quarter century before World \-Jar I was almost as phenomenal
as the outward expansion of the boundaries of the Empire.
By 1890, at the inception of the constitutional monarchy,
the nation's finances had finally been placed on an expen-
diture. Agricultural resources had been able to keep pace
with the increases in population. In fact, there had been
a surplus of rice since the quinquennium 1378- 1S82 which
permitted an average annual export of 272,000 koku.
3y May, 1915, when Japan confronted China with an
ultimatum, demanding compliance with four of the five
groups of the Twenty-Cne Demands, the general economic pic-
ture had changed radically. Japan had passed through its
initial phase of economic growth and had entered a period
of accelerated increase in the individual worker's pro-
ductivity, in capital investment, in industrial special-
lfiOization and concentration.
Between 1390 and 1914, Japan's economic growth had
increased at a remarkable rate but also showed clear signs
of strain. Just when a crisis seemed inevitable, the
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acute demands of the Allied Powers for munitions, ship-
ping, and supplies during World War 1 enabled Japan to
solve, at least temporarily, its major economic and
financial problems. So long as the foreign market for
Japanese goods and services held, the country's eco-
nomic future could be left to take care of itself. Further-
more, the territorial settlement of the war provided new
areas for economic development and exploitation. The
colony of Formosa, with its estimated population of 2.6
million in 1898, offered new and tempting markets for
the products of Japanese industry . Its area was equal to
almost one-tenth of Japan proper; its climate was tropical
with abundant rainfall. With a minimum of investment and
with the establishment of internal security, the island
soon became a valuable source of important raw materials
and agricultural products. Camphor, lumber, rice, and sugar
were shipped to Japan, and were to become important elements
«-u - i I61in the impure* s economy.
3y the Peace Treaty of 1895, China had recognized that
independence of political stability could be maintained in
Korea and discriminatory tariffs against foreign goods
could be enforced. Japanese merchants and investors were
free to exploit Korean markets and resources. In fact,
such exploitation would increase in direct proportion to
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Japan's control over Korea. Cn the other hand, Korea's
strategic importance would have the greatest impact on
Japan's economic development. As it was argued that
control of Korea was essential for the nation's security,
the creation of a military machine of sufficient strength
to achieve this goal was a matter of the highest priority.
Specifically, this meant that an enlarged and modernized
army and navy were requisites for preventing Prussian
162
encroachments in Korea.
Japan's original program in Korea was designed to
make it a base for expansion on the Asiatic mainland and
a source of raw materials and foodstuffs. Gradually,
Korea was supplied with a good system of roads and rail-
ways (there were 3,427 miles of railway by 1939), because
this system of communications was extremely important for
moving troops into Manchuria and to the Russian border.
The Japanese closed Korea as an import or export market
for foreigners; practically all Korean raw materials
were exported to Japan. In 1939, exports from Korea were
valued at 1,006,794,000 yen; 73.2 percent (by value) of
them went to Japan, 20.4 percent to Japanese-dominated
Manchuria, 3.3 percent to the part of China occupied by
Japan, and only 0.5 percent to European and American
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countries. In the same year, Japan supplied Korea with
88.6 percent of its imports; of the remainder, 5.3 percent
came from Manchuria and only 3 percent from Europe and
America. When Japan annexed Korea it found an oriental
rural setup with rich landlords and numerous poor tenants
the outstanding feature. Japan wanted landlords who had
a marketable surplus of rice and as a result did everything
possible to strengthen the system. Three decades later, the
percentage of tenants and owner- tenants (those who have
some land of their own, but are compelled to rent additional
land) totaled almost 80 percent of the total number of farm-
ers.
Following the rice riots in Japan at the end of the
First World War, the Japanese undertook intensive develop-
ment of Korea as a granary of the Empire. Through various
devices, moreover, they appropriated at least one-quarter
of the cultivated area of the country, including especially
the rice fields. Almost half of the annual yield of rice
was exported to Japan, as well as a large proportion of
other agricultural products. Even when crops were normal,
Korea was itself short of food. Governor- General Ugaki
remarked in 1934 that the Korean farmers "would dig out
and eat roots of trees on the mountains and fields or
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would beg from every door to keep themselves alive."
Evidently the agricultural measures undertaken by the
Japanese government in Korea were designed to meet its own
164
needs, not the needs of the local population.
Japan did not encourage the industrial development
of Korea for a long while, but in 1929-30 there was a
change of policy. Those were the years when the Japanese
militarists began to plan their conquests and to prepare
for the great war which they openly advocated. A rapid
development of industry followed. The gross value of man-
ufactured goods rose from 327,000,000 yen in 1929 to
1,873,000,000 in 1941 (partly, however, due to inflation).
Greater and greater investments were poured into Korean
industry, and by the end of the war Korea had made sub-
stantial progress in developing heavy industry, including
machine-tool plants. Even as late as 1938, however, 76
percent of Koreans were occupied in agriculture.
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VI. The Assertion of Japanese Hegemony in the Far £ast
:
L905-I9L3
A new level of Japanese power in eastern Asia had been
reached in 1917-1918. The first World War had enabled
Japan to change from a borrowing to a lending nation, from
a state with a constantly adverse trade balance to one with
a favorable balance; from a nation with inadequate gold
reserves to one with a large gold surplus. It had also
enabled Japan to give free play to any continental aspir-
ations which it had, without fear of foreign interference.
But it was because the necessary preliminary steps had been
taken, that Japan was able to utilize the opportunity pre-
sented to it by the war. It was because Japan had already
introduced modem methods of production that it was able
to enlarge its markets , and it was as a result of the
earlier efforts to build up a merchant marine that Japanese
bottoms were able to monopolize the Pacific shipping. It
was also because the ground work had already been laid
that Japan was enabled to attain at least temporary hegemony
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in the Far Zast.
There were two paths Japan could take. The first was
to do, in East Asia, what all the Great Powers had done as
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soon as they commanded the means---try to get possession
or control over all the countries and principalities that
were too weak to resist. Then it would enter the imperial
race for mastery over the Asiatic continent, China in
particular, hoping to win over the other contenders, be-
cause it was nearer the goal. The other path Japan could
choose was the direct opposite. It had itself barely
escaped subjugation to the West by foresight, intelligent
preparation and high resolve. In doing so it had set an
example to its still weak neighbors. Japan proved that an
Eastern nation could save itself by its own efforts, and
that it could take the lead in showing its neighbors how
to do so. In short, Japan set itself up as protector of
its part of the world against the aggressive West. Japan
showed that it could, without formal verbal pronouncement,
institute a kind of Monroe Doctrine for Asia, a policy of
not interfering with such territorial possessions and pol-
itical and economic privileges as the West already had but
16 7
enjoining any expansion of influence.
The political principle expressed in the phrase "a
Japanese Monroe Doctrine" has been used more and more
frequently by the Japanese to interpret and to justify
their policy in the Far East. Occasionally other terms
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are employed to express much the same idea, such as
"paramount interest , " "special interest," "Asia for the
Asiatics," "Japanese leadership," and "the right to live."
Whatever the name, a fundamental doctrine or policy was
developed, and it constituted a major factor in the
affairs of Eastern Asia; it goes far to explain Japan's
specific actions in China as well as its general attitude
toward the Powers in matters concerning the Far East.
Viscount Ishii, acting as the Special Ambassador of Japan
at Washington in 1917, spoke of a Monroe Doctrine for Asia,
and asked Secretary Lansing to recognize that Japan had a
"paramount interest" in China. In his published memoirs,
this distinguished Japanese statesman writes: "From our
point of view, Japan possesses interests superior to other
powers in China as a whole, especially in the contiguous
regions, much as the position of your country in the West-
ern Hemisphere, especially in Mexico and Central American
169
countries."
Japan chose the first option. There were unmistakable
intimations as early as the Portsmouth Peace Conference, at
which it insisted on taking over Prussia's leasehold on the
Liaotung Peninsula and the southern half of the Manchurian
railway. Thereby it acquired Port Arthur and Dalny and a
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foothold on Chinese soil. China, of course, was forced
in a formal agreement to concede the transfer of Russian
rights to Japan, with some additional rights that Russia
had not had.
The treatment of Korea was even more indicative than
was the treatment of Manchuria. The Treaty of Shimonoseki,
which ended the China-Japan war in 1895, contained a formal
pronouncement of Korea's independence. This independence
was reaffirmed in the Nishi-Rosen Convention of 1898, in
which Russia and Japan bound themselves not to infringe on
Korea's political and territorial integrity. The Treaty of
Portsmouth included Russian recognition of Japan's para-
mount interests in Korea, and Japan at once made clear its
construction of that provision. Even before the end of the
war, however, it had left no doubt as to what it would do
if it had a free hand in Korea. Simultaneously with the
attack on Port Arthur, Japan landed a military force in the
port of Chemulpo and occupied Seoul. On February 23, 1904,
before the war was a month old, a protocol was signed be-
tween Korea and Japan, under Japanese guns of course, which
laid the foundation for a protectorate. Cn November 17,
two months after peace with Russia was concluded, Japan
wrung from the helpless court at Seoul a convention by
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which it obtained control of Korea 1 s foreign relations and
the right to maintain a Resident in Seoul,
As one of the preliminaries to the final contest,
the first Anglo-Japanese agreement was negotiated in 1902.
This was founded inter alia on a recognition of the inde-
pendence of Korea with, however, a recognition as well of
Japan's peculiar political, commercial and industrial inter-
ests in the peninsula. The revised agreement of 1905 pro-
vided that "Japan, possessing paramount political, military,
and economic interests in Korea, Great Britain recognizes
the right of Japan to take such measures of guidance, con-
trol, and protection in Korea as she may deem proper and
necessary to safeguard and advance these interests, provided
always that such measures are not contrary to the principle
of equal opportunities for :the commerce and industry of all
nations." 171
Following the war a protectorate was established and
Prince Ito became the first Resident- General. This status
was maintained until 1910, when a treaty of annexation was
concluded between the Korean ruler and the Japanese Emperor,
represented by General Terauchi, the Japanese Resident. In-
corporation into the Japanese Empire, of course, ended for
the time being the international personality of Korea. Cne
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consequence of the international acceptance of this
change was the termination of foreign governmental
intrigue in the country although, from time to time, ac-
cusations were brought against American missionaries that
they were preaching seditious doctrines in their schools
and, as late as 1920, a British subject, resident at
Antung, was arrested when in Korea "because he had long
been suspect as an abettor and friend of the Korean in-
dependence agitators. Internal turmoil ceased except
for the independence movement.
From the expansion of trade Japan naturally gained
the greatest advantage; almost ninety percent of the
total trade being with Japan. In the internal develop-
ment of the country, the predominance of Japanese in-
terest was even more marked. Japanese actions were
motivated by the desire to make the area of greater
value to Japan rather than by an interest in improving
the condition of the Korean people. This is not to deny
that the Koreans benefited materially by many of the
improvements made. Cn the other side, it must be recog-
nized that the forcible introduction of the Japanese
language at the expense of the Korean; the suppression
of Korean literature and of Korean institutions; the
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expropriation and sale, mostly to Japanese settlers,
of a large part of the public lands which had been of
common use to people; the forced sale of much of the best
privately owned property, with the consequent migration
into Manchuria of the people whose lands had been taken;
the repression of speech and suppression of Korean papers;
and the exhibition of much brutality in dealing with the
people did not promote the free and full acceptance of
Japanese overlordship. The Koreans were not satisfied with
the educational efforts of Japan, ".-Jhile there were 330
elementary schools solely for Japanese children, there
were only about four hundred for the Koreans, although the
Japanese constituted less than two percent of the total
population. This seemed rather out of proportion. Further-
more, the schools for Koreans were designed primarily to
make them good subjects of Japan, to which emphatic excep-
174tion was taken.
The Koreans 1 objections to Japanese rule, together
with the 1918 world-wide enthusiasm for democracy and the
principle of the self-determination of peoples, produced
a serious revolt against the Japanese in Korea in 1919.
This took the internal form of passive resistance and the
external form of an aDoeal to the Paris Peace Conference
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which, however, refused to take cognizance of the claims
of the "Provisional Government of Korea" which was or-
ganized at Shanghai. The latter was dispersed by the
authorities administering the French settlement, the
internal Korean movement was ruthlessly suppressed, and
Japanese prestige was maintained. Many malcontents were
left on the Manchurian side of the border, in Siberia and
elsewhere. The Japanese authorities dispersed the fug-
itives in Manchuria after several raids on Chinese ter-
ritory, and the independence movement, at least for a time,




A, Japan in Manchuria
There are conflicting views concerning Japan's ac-
tivities in Manchuria from 1905 to 1914, and as many con-
clusions as to their justification. The Japanese position,
in essence, was that they had made tremendous sacrifices in
men and resources to drive the Russians out of South Manchuria,
and that by treaty they succeeded to a position there which
justified them in regarding it as a "sphere of interest."
They claimed that in the development of their interests in
this sphere they made use only of such methods as the
European states had employed in China and elsewhere, and
they argued that until those methods x^ere generally and
universally repudiated they should not be condemned for
utilizing them. They insisted that they were under only
two limitations in their succession to the Russian position
that they would observe the Cpen Door principle, by the
three propositions of Secretary Hay's Cpen Door circular
of 1899, and that they would respect the independence and
integrity of China. Those pledges they claimed to have
observed at least until 1931. Consequently they main-
tained that the criticism leveled against their Manchurian
1 7fi
activities was totally unwarranted.
115

It was in Manchuria that Japan most clearly
committed itself to imperialist orthodoxy,
participating in the purest imperialistic
rites of division of prospective spoils by
rivals both desiring the whole, suspicious
of each other, but not yet ready to try con-
. . 177
elusions.
After some preliminary maneuvers with France, Russia's
ally, as go between, Russia and Japan contracted a new
agreement on July 30, 1907, which sought to make precise
USthe future relations between them in East Asia. Coupled
with this was a reaffirmation of the Cpen Door principle
more in the nature of a nonaggression pact and containing
secret clauses, relating to spheres of interest in Manchuria,
Russia's special rights in Mongolia, and Japanese domination
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of Korea. The secret agreement addressed the subject that
interested the two parties and brought them together. A
line was drawn in Manchuria marking two spheres, Russia
130
having the North and Japan the South
•
Neither would interfere in the other's sphere in
political or economic matters. Russia again recognized
Japan's "special interests" in Korea, while Japan rec-
ognized Russia's special interests in Mongolia; thereby
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confirming the death sentence for Korea and Mongolia.
The new rapprochement between Russia and Japan (no one
had any illusion that the public version of the treaty
between them was the whole of it) raised, and justly, the
fear that the two main contenders for Manchuria were now
working together instead of checking each other as before
from which it might be assumed that Manchuria was close to
181being lost to China»
To underline their determination to resist any out-
side attempts to interfere with their special rights in
Manchuria, a new Russo-Japanese Convention was concluded
in July 1910. Under its terms the two signatories agreed
to maintain the status quo in Manchuria; to take joint
action if their respective interests were threatened ; and,
while developing railway communications in Manchuria, to
abstain from competing with each other in such work. Like
the 1907 convention, which the new agreement superseded,
secret clauses were added defining their respective spheres
of interest in Manchuria and imposing restrictions on each
other in these spheres. Two years later, in 1912, a
further understanding between the two was reached. This
was in the form of a secret treaty under which Mongolia
was divided into similar spheres with eastern Inner
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182Mongolia, adjoining Manchuria, allotted to Japan.
The Chinese therefore decided to push their own in-
fluence in Manchuria by building railroads, preferably with
foreign capital, which would give other Powers a stake in
maintaining the status quo. The other Powers too began to
interest themselves in the development of Manchuria, mainly
through railway construction. The British obtained from
the Chinese a concession to build one line although the
contract was never fulfilled partly because of Japanese
objection. The United States also intervened in Manchurian
politics for the first time. After the Russo-Japaness war,
S. H. Harriman made tenders for the purchase of the South
Manchuria Railway. He was rebuffed but his interest did
not fade. TJith Taft in the White House and Philander C.
Knox as Secretary of State, dollar diplomacy became the
guiding principle. The U.S. government shared Harriman 1 s
interest and actively engaged in Manchurian politics.
l .3 3
Railways became the tokens in the international struggle."
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B. Knox's iManchurian Meddling
Japan had received both moral and financial support from
the U.S. at the time of its war with Russia, but Japan had
been eyed with some suspicion by the United States Government
since the days just prior to the American annexation of
Hawaii in 1898, when there were disputes between the Hawaiian
and Japanese Governments over the question of Japanese im-
migration and when Japan had adopted a threatening attitude.
America, at that time, was already being urged by believers
in its "manifest destiny" to play a leading role on the
Asiatic side of the Pacific. U.S. acquisition of the Phil-
ippines and Guam, as a result of the war with Spain, brought
it appreciably nearer its goal. Hawaii might be the naval
"key of the Pacific" and the commercial crossroads of that
ocean, but the Philippines were more immediately accessible
to China where the other great powers were engaged in a
scramble for the commercial and strategic advantages offered.
To put a stop to this unseemly display and to ensure equal
opportunities for all in the trade, navigation and commerce
of China, the United States Secretary of State, John Hay,
in 1899 induced the powers to accept the principle of the
"Open Door and Equal Opportunity". 1 ^ Russia and Germany
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made it clear, in the years immediately preceding the Russo-
Japanese War, that they did not recognize this principle as
applying to Manchuria. Japan, after its defeat of Russia,
185took the same view and aroused similar criticsm. The
aggressive Japanese and Russians had by 1907 divided China's
Manchuria into southern and northern economic spheres of
influence. The Russians enjoyed a dominant position in
northern Manchuria, with their key Chinese Eastern Railway,
while the Japanese, with their vital South Manchuria Rail-
way, were firmly entrenched in southern Manchuria. Knox
feared, with good reason, that the increasing influence of
these two outside powers boded ill for the integrity of China
and the sanctity of the Open Door Policy. He, therefore,
cast about for a scheme that would enable him to use American
dollars to block this ominous penetration. ^-°"
Secretary Knox conceived the idea of cutting through
the whole net of rivalries in Manchuria by internationalizing
the entire railway system of the area with ownership vested
187
in China but the capital and administration international.
Knox finally evolved his surprising Manchurian Railroad
proposal which he communicated to the interested powers late
in 1909. Its essence was that American and European banking
groups would lend the Chinese government a huge sum of money.
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China, in turn, would use the funds thus advanced to regain
full control of Manchuria by buying the railroads. Knox
privately confessed that he was attempting to "smoke Japan
out" from her dominant position. S8
The alternative plans proposed were: (1) The Russian
and Japanese railroads in Manchuria should be purchased by
China aided financially by the powers; they should then be
supervised by nationals of the co-operating powers, and
materials and employees should be procured from these nations
"upon an equitable basis inter se." (2) Great Britain and
the United States might give diplomatic support to China in
the construction of a line from Chinchow to Aigun which would
approximately parallel the South Manchuria railway but at no
point be nearer to it than one hundred fifty miles, and they
might invite ^9
"the interested powers, friendly to complete com-
mercial neutralization of Manchuria, to participate
in the financing and construction of that line and
of such additional lines as future commercial de-
velopment may demand; and, at the same time, to
supply funds for the purchase by China of such
existing lines as might be offered for inclusion
in this system. "190
Secretary Knox communicated his scheme to the British
government in November, 1909, without first sounding out all
the interested parties. Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign
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Secretary, with a fine instinct for diplomatic generalities
while expressing approval of the "general principle" of the
first plan, suggested temporary postponement of its con-
sideration. As for the alternative plan, he briefly sug-
gested the desirability of Japanese participation in the
191Chinchow-Aigum line.
Secretary Knox next instructed the United States rep-
resentatives in Peking, Tokyo, St. Petersburg, Berlin and
Paris to broach his scheme to the governments to which they
were respectively accredited. ^-^^ China and Germany expressed
approval. Russia and Japan refused definitely to have any-
thing to do with neutralization; the former on the ground
that there was no need for it and that Russian interests
would suffer, the latter on the ground that the plan was not
in accord with the Treaty of Portsmouth, that it provided
for a system not to be found elsewhere in China, and that
divided responsibility would work to the disadvantage of the
193public. France agreed with Russia and Japan.
The proposed Chinchow-Aigun line was also blocked by
Russia and Japan during the early months of 1910. Russia
and Japan now decided to close ranks against all interlopers
in their private preserve. They moved to make their quasi-
alliance more explicit. There were more negotiations, and
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in 1910 another treaty was concluded, part of it public and
the more important part secret. This agreement reaffirmed
the division of spheres made in 1907, but sent further than
the pledge not to interfere with rights in the other's sphere 19 '
Inner Mongolia was now included in the area allocated
to the "special interests" of the two parties, Russia getting
a free hand in western Inner Mongolia and Japan in eastern
Inner Mongolia. Outer Mongolia, incidentally, had previously
been set aside by Russia for its exclusive purposes. Korea
having been settled, and Manchuria in the process of settle-
ment, Mongolia was now designated for transactions of the same
order. 195
The fruits of Knox's abortive Manchurian scheme were
almost wholly bitter. He weakened the integrity of China
instead of strengthening it by driving Japan and Russia closer
together. He not only offended the Japanese by his inept
approach but apparently reversed Roosevelt's policy under the
Root-Takahira Agreement of 1908, an agreement which recognized
Japan's special position in Manchuria. i9&
Regardless of the approval or disapproval of its nationals
in China, England by renewal of the Anglo -Japanese Alliance
in 1905, and by the signing of the Russian convention of 1907
had given evidence of its decision to treat the Far East from
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the viewpoint fo the welfare of the empire as a whole.
England was bound to Japan, and Japan and Russia were
now allies. Knox's diplomacy forced Russia and Japan to admit
officially, if indirectly, that their declarations and promises
to China and to the United States with reference to the Open
198
Door were worthless.
Knox's Far Eastern policy has been branded as one of
"bluff and back down." His naive, lone-hand tactics were fore-
doomed to failure. The United States, acting alone, had
neither the naval nor the land forces to halt the Japanese or
the Russians in the Far East. Even had the U.S. boasted a
formidable army, public opinion would not have tolerated a
war over faraway economic interests that were of such slight
199importance.
Japan and Russia had fought one of the most terrible wars
since Waterloo, and in less than a decade had become partners.
But since they were partners in the acquisition and distri-
bution of loot, in hand and in prospect, the change in relations
may have been external and temporary rather than genuine and
lasting. Japan's role in the politics of East Asia was now
unmistakable. The island power was to shape forces and events





VII. World War I:
Japan Becomes Aggressive
Precipitated by events outside of Asia, a still
greater transformation was now about to begin for
East Asia. The European war broke out. Asia was not
even dimly aware of why the war came and what brought
it about and was even less concerned, but it was des-
201tined to be only a little less affected than Europe.
In September, 1914, following the outbreak of
hostilities in Europe, President Yuan Shih-K'ai re-
marked to the American minister, "Japan is going to
take advantage of this war to get control of China."
Contemporaneously, another high official, Admiral
Ts'ai T'ing-Kan, observed, "Here are the beginnings of
another Manchuria. Aggressive Japan in Shantung is
202different from any European tenant." as early as August
3, China requested the United States to obtain from the
European belligerents assurances that the European war
would not carry into Chinese territories or waters , a
request which the American government acted upon with-
out success.
The republic, while proclaiming its neutrality by
presidential mandate, began negotiations with Germany
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and China with a view to the restoration of the German
Leased Territory of Kiaochow to China. Under the terms
of its agreement, Germany had the right to give up its
Leasehold at Kiaochow at any time in return for a more
suitable port elsewhere in China. In- Tokyo the cab-
inet had been closely watching developments in Europe.
The feeling prevailed that at last the time had come to
destroy Teutonic influence in eastern Asia and avenge
that part of the "insult" suffered at the hands of
Germany in connection with the tripartite intervention
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of 1895.
The European war put the whole Far East in flux.
The first, and perhaps most important, thing it did was
to give Japan a free hand in Asia. Europe was engaged in
its own death struggle and had neither time nor strength
for remote areas. America, at first unengaged, was
partially involved through its emotions and through its
desire to maintain freedom of the seas. America, there-
fore, could give only half of its attention to the Far
East until 1917, and after that no attention was given
- 11 205at all.
The outbreak of war in Europe in August, 1914, and
126

its global repercussions swiftly shifted interest from
the national to the international arena. Here, too,
Ckuma was to follow an aggressive policy. Despite
his interest in an earlier life in parliamentary
government and in the rights of the people, he did not
apply his modified concepts of the rights of man to
questions of international relations. Indeed, the
policies he advocated toward China were a sad commentary
on his "liberalism." As Premier in 1915, he sponsored
a policy which forced China to become subservient both
politically and economically to Japan. To Ckuma and
his colleagues, such liberalism as they advocated could
not be allowed to interfere with Japan's destiny to
r. 206secure a predominant and ruling position in East Asia.
Japan's leading statesmen were constantly on the
alert for any opportunity that would permit them to
achieve this objective. They had been apprehensive of
the effect on Japan of the Chinese Revolution and of the
downfall of the Kanchu dynasty on February 12, 1912.
Although the Japanese public in general supported the
revolutionaries, the government announced that it would
remain neutral. While the clan bureaucrats were casting
covetous eyes on Manchuria and north China and were
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hopeful that they would be able to extend Japan's in-
fluence on the continent, World War I gave them the chance
they were seeking.
A new China policy developed rapidly under the
leadership of Foreign Minister Kato Komei a While
Ambassador to London, he had received assurances from
3ritish Foreign Minister Viscount Grey that England would
not object to Japan's taking up with China, at an appro-
priate time, the question of the extension of the leases
in Kwantung and South Manchuria, Upon his return to Tokyo
to become Foreign Minister in the third Katsura Cabinet,
Kato continued his efforts to support a strong Japanese
policy toward China. When the Ckuma Cabinet was formed
in April, 1914, Kato was again appointed Foreign Minister.
It was not surprising, therefore, that with the outbreak
of World War I he advocated an aggressive foreign policy.
Kato had concluded that the preoccupation of European
countries with the war against Germany and with the
Entente would leave Japan free to act as it desired in
China.208
Japan's entrance into World War 1 derived its
sanction from a double basis: The nation's commitments
under the Anglo-Japanese alliance, and the larger
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political and military purposes of Japan's emerging
Asian policy. Cn August 7, 1914, three days after its
declaration of war, Great 3ritain requested Japan to
destroy the 'German fleet in Pacific waters. The de-
cision of the Japanese government, made on August 3,
was to demand of Germany not only surrender of its
armed ships in Asian waters (thus complying with the
British request) but also surrender of the Kiaochou
leasehold in Shantung. Cn August 23, as Germany ignored
Tokyo's ultimatum, Japan entered the war. This mom-
entous decision to join Great 3ritain in the war (as
explained by Count Kato Komei, the foreign minister) was
not based on legal obligations of the Anglo-Japanese
alliance, for "the general conditions were not such as
to impose upon Japan the duty to join the war under
treaty obligations," but "as a voluntary expression of
209friendship toward Great Britain under the Alliance."
What Japan meant was that it welcomed an opportunity to
destroy German influence in East Asia and to enhance its
210 , . ...
own international position. In taking the initiative,
Britain apparently sought an explicitly limited Japanese
participation. That did not interest the Japanese govern-
ment. The Japanese at first based their participation on
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their obligations so strongly after they had driven the
Germans from their holdings in Shantung province and
from the islands in the Pacific north of the equator.
Japan had utilized the Anglo -Japanese alliance for
its own purposes, and it had no intention of joining in
the European slaughter. But its willingness to help with
strikes against German shipping extended to the South
Pacific. During the fall of 1914 Japanese naval forces
occupied the German islands in the North Pacific; the
Marshalls, Marianas, Palaus, the Carolines, Yap, all names
that would become household words during World War II,
shifted from German to Japanese hands. By 1917 Japanese
naval units controlled the entire South Pacific and
Indian Ocean areas. Repeated British requests for Jap-
anese help in the Mediterranean area brought a convoy
force in 1917. Further French and Russian requests
for Japanese army units to join the ground fighting in
2.1 2Europe fell on deaf ears.
World War I thus saw Japan develop a strong bargaining
position in international politics. Before the dispatch
of Japanese naval units to the Mediterranean in 1917,
secret agreements with England, France, Italy and Russia
brought guarantees that Japan's claims to the German
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leaseholds in Shantung and to the Pacific islands north
of the equator would be honored in the peace settlement.
As a result of Allied support, the Pacific islands were
mandated to Japanese authority and Shantung left to
213Smo-Japanese settlement.
To inform the rest of the world of Japan's inten-
tions, the Premier, Count Okuma, cabled a message for
publication in the United States in which he said:
"Japan has no territorial ambition, and hopes to stand
as the protector of peace in the Orient."^
After the fall of Tsingtao on November 7, the Jap-
anese proceeded in a systematic manner to establish them-
selves in Shantung province. They took over the German
interests outside of the leased area as a matter of
course, including the Tsinanfu-Tsingtao railway, the line
southward from Kaomi, the mines developed by Germany in
the fifteen years of its occupation, and the various
public and private property rights of Germany throughout
the province. Not stopping with a mere succession to
the German rights, titles, and privileges, Japan added,
or attempted to add, considerably to them. ^^
Japan also took over from the Chinese, on the plea
of military necessity, the policing of the railroads
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outside the leased territory. Japanese replaced Germans
o 1 A
in the Chinese customs house at Tsingtao. So far as
the evacuation of the territory and its "restoration to
China" was concerned, the Japanese Foreign Minister, in
reply to questions in the Diet, said that Japan was
under no obligation to restore the leased area, as its
pledge had been made subject to Germany's handing it
over without trouble. The sacrifice of Japanese men and
the expenditure of Japanese money in the reduction of
the port had created a new situation, one which might
have to resolve itself along different lines. What these
2l7
new lines were to be was shortly indicated.
On January 7, 1915, with German resistance in Shan-
tung ended and with it the need for the military zone,
President Yuan Shih-K'-ai informed the Japanese that
China's neutrality would again extend over all of the
province of Shantung outside of the leased territory.
The Japanese immediately protested against the ending of
the military zone as an unfriendly act, seizing upon it
as the excuse for the presentation to the Chinese gov-
ernment of far-reaching demands.
With the cancellation by Peking of the war zone on
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January 7, 1915, the moment had arrived and, on the night
of the eighteenth, Minister Hioki personally presented
the Kato demands to President Yuan instead of using the







A. The Twenty-One Demands
The Russian maneuvers in Outer Mongolia and the British
penetration of Tibet were conducted under the pretence of
supporting local autonomous movements against an inefficient,
corrupt central authority and such justifications could be
advanced however flimsy. Japan's intervention in China,
on the other hand, was brazenly brutal and lacked any of
the arguments one might advance to defend the Russian or
British actions. Japan's territorial ambition was directed
against heavily populated China proper rather than against
the outer territories sparsley inhabited by Mongolian and
Tibetan minorities.
Japan's ambition with regard to China was common
knowledge, but until World War I Japan had not been able
to translate its ambition into reality, partly because
of China's distrust of Japanese motives and designs after
the Sino -Japanese War and partly because of the lack of
capital on the part of Japan to pursue effective dollar
diplomacy such as Western powers then pursued in China.
Meanwhile, Japan was waiting patiently for the arrival




In addition to both general and specific tendencies
toward Japanese expansion clearly perceptible through-
out the post-restoration period, several developments had
occurred during recent years, in connection with China,
which contributed to the Kato policy. Among these were
problems related to (1) railway construction in southern
Manchuria (1907-10); (2) the activities of the inter-
national consortium; (3) the fear that the Chinese govern-
ment might obtain control of the Hanyehping Company (China's
largest iron and steel works) and might oust Japanese in-
terests therein; (4) the fear that, with American finan-
cial aid, a naval base might be established in Fukien;
(5) the growing influence of Great Britain in Tibet and
of Russia in Mongolia; and (6) the old policy of the
Chinese to divide and rule by playing off one ''barbarian"
against another manifested during a generation of in-
creasing Japanese encroachment upon the empire by "be-
friending the Far and antagonizing the Near. "^
On January 18, 1915, Japanese Minister Hioki at Peking
presented to President Yuan Shih-K'ai a group of twenty-
one demands (16 demands and 5 'desires') designed to
"insure" Japan's position in China at a time when Europe
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was preoccupied with war. Japan began a new chapter in
its policy of expansion. In particular, it hoped to
establish a solid legal basis for its special interests
222in Manchuria.
Although European powers had recognized Japanese
claims in Manchuria, China had not. A second phase of
Japanese policy in 1915 concerned itself with the nation's
position and influence south of the Great Wall in China
proper. In the scramble there for railway and min.
concessions, Japan, as a debtor nation, was at a disad-
vantage against European and American competitors. As
seen in Tokyo, the weakness of Japan's position could
only be corrected by the assertion of specific rights
and, if possible, of a general and paramount influence
223
over all of China.
Foreign Minister Kato envisaged the twenty-one demands
as an attempt at an ( '"across-the-board' ) settlement of out-
standing problems in exchange for Japan's promise to re-
turn Shantung. They were divided into five groups:
Group I dealt with Shantung where large numbers of Jap-
anese troops were stationed and where an administrative
arrangement of some sort would have to be negotiated
between Japan and China; Group II referred to Manchuria
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where Japan's leases were due to run out in 1923 and
where it wanted to obtain extensions of the leases to
ninety-nine years. The other groups of demands covered
industries, arsenals, railways, harbors, and dockyards;
the whole spectrum of China's modernization.
Group V was considered by the Japanese to be dif-
ferent in character from the rest, containing only 'de-
sirable items' whose adjustments would be beneficial to
225both countries. Its major items were: (1) the employ-
ment of Japanese as political, financial, and military
advisers in the Chinese central government; (2) the right
of Japanese to own land for the construction of hospitals,
temples and schools; (3) the joint control of Chinese
police force; (4) the purchase of Japanese arms by China
and the establishment of ammunition factories jointly
controlled by China and Japan; (5) the granting of rail-
road construction rights to Japan in the central lakes
region; (6) China was to consult Japan if it wished to
borrow foreign capital to finance railroad construction,
mining, and other economic activities such as harbor
improvement in Fukien province; and (7) China was to
grant Japan the right of "preaching religion" in China.
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The last article was perhaps the most ironical; obviously
the Japanese had in mind the Western missionaries who
allegedly served the imperialist interests of their re-
+ • 226spective countries.
None of the proposals affected China's formal in-
dependence, sovereignty, or integrity. Actually, China
would be brought under the sway of Japan in the manner
227
most approved by modern imperialism.
President Yuan Shih-kai was desperate. Sinister in-
fluences had been brought to bear against him by the
Japanese Minister and others. Full advantage was taken
of the fact that Yuan was obsessed with the idea of re-
storing the monarchy to China with himself as the first
Emperor of the new dynasty. He was reminded that the
whole country was seething with unrest, that the ranks
of those opposed to such a movement were daily swelling,
and that their determination to block such a move, by
revolution if necessary, was growing stronger daily.
Aided by Japanese finance, it was insinuated, this movement
would become irresistible. Agree to Japan's demands,
Yuan Shih-Kai was told, and the road to the dragon throne
would lie open. Refuse, and Japan would lend its support
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to the revolutionists. To refuse would mean irrevocable
defeat for all such grandiose plans and the loss of all
power, if not life itself. On May 8, President Yuan Shih-
228Kai accepted the demands as they stood.
It is worthwhile to summarize the agreements actually
reached between China and Japan dated iMay 25, 1915. This
can be done most conveniently and simply by geographical






B. The 1915 Treaties
The treaty respecting South Manchuria and Eastern
Inner Mongolia provided: (1) that the lease of Port
Arthur and Dalny and the terras of the South Manchurian and
the Antung-Mukden railway agreements be extended to 99
years; (2) that Japanese subjects might reside and travel
in South Manchuria, engage in business and manufacturing,
and lease land outside of the treaty ports for trade or
agricultural purposes; (3) that the Chinese government
would give its permission to any joint Chinese -Japanese
enterprises; (4) that Japanese subjects should be subject
to Chinese local law, but that the extraterritorial system,
so far as the trial of offenders was concerned, should
persist; (5) that China should open to foreign trade and
residence suitable places in Eastern Inner Mongolia;
(6) that the Kirin -Changchun railway loan agreement should
be revised in favor of Japan. By separate notes China
conceded: (1) that Japanese subjects should have the
right to open mines in certain areas specified by the
Japanese; (2) that if it sought foreign capital for rail-
way construction in Manchuria in the future, application
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would be made first to Japan; and (3) that if it found
it necessary to employ foreign financial, military, or
police advisers in South Manchuria, they should be
230Japanese
.
The Shantung treaty provided: (1) that China should
give "full assent to all matters upon which the Japanese
government may hereafter agree with the German government
relating to the disposition of all rights, interests, and
concessions wnich Germany, by virtue of treaties or other-
wise, possesses in relation to the Province of Shantung";
(2) that Japanese capitalists should have the right to
build the Chefoo-Weihsien railway, in the event Germany
abandoned the privilege of financing it; and (3) that
additional places for foreign residence and trade should
be opened by China herself in the province. In an ex-
change of notes, China agreed not to alienate any territory
within the province or islands along the coast to any foreign
power on any pretext whatsoever.
In a separate note, Japan indicated its intentions
of restoring the leased territory of Kiaochow Bay to
China on the condition that China would open the whole of
the bay as a commercial port, that it would set aside an
area to be designated by the Japanese government as a
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residential concession to be under the exclusive jur-
isdiction of Japan, and that an international settle-
ment would be provided for the residence of other for-
eigners if they desire it.^^^As for Fukien province, the
Chinese government stated that it had given no permission
to foreign nations to construct on its coast dockyards,
coaling stations for military use or naval bases and that
it had no intention of borrowing foreign capital for those
purposes. It is apparent that Japan's objectives on the
continent had changed from the purely territorial to the
economic. It had first urged, as justification of its
policy, the need for expansion on the continent, so that
by colonization it might take care of its excess popu-
lation.
From 1914 on Japan did not demand control of terri-
tory for colonization because all of its experiments in
that direction had failed. It was not Japanese farmers
who were to be found in Korea, Formosa and South Manchuria,
but shopkeepers, concession-hunters and developers. This
partly explains the change in objective. To this must be
added a change at home which tremendously affected the
national development. The outbreak of the war greatly
stimulated Japanese industry. Just as in the United States,
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those industries related to war supply were expanded
in every direction. In Japan the established companies
both in the field of munitions supply and other allied
areas, and in the field of non-military production for
the purpose of supplying markets temporarily vacated by
Europe, were enormously expanded, and new enterprises
sprang up over night. This industrial expansion strik-
ingly called attention to Japan's reliance on foreign
nations for certain essential raw materials for industry
such as coal and iron. It caused Japanese statesmen to
think of the war as an opportunity to secure these es-
sentials. Furthermore, a capitalist class had been de-
veloping in Japan as a result of its industrial develop-
ment prior to and especially after the war with Russia.
233This class became all- important during World War I.
With the signing of the treaties the negotiations
ended, but the incident was not closed. The people of
China had not consented. The treaties had been signed
by President Yuan Shih-Kai and his associates, but the
signatures had been secured by an ultimatum backed by
force, although there had been no war between the two
nations. They had never been ratified by any Chinese
legislative body and successive Chinese Governments
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declared them to be null and void. Japan, however, re-
garded them as binding, and was ready for its next move.
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C. The 1917 Secret Treaties
Japan had laid a foundation for an Asiatic empire,
with China as the colonial center. The direct thrust
having failed of complete success, Japan now took the
oblique approach. It adopted a time-honored strategy
in the relations of strong and weak nations.— It would
attempt to conquer a country through some of that
country's own nationals. It would look for political
factions that wanted support against their rivals and
give support in return for doing Japan's bidding; the
technique of finding, establishing, and working through
puppets. In the feudal atmosphere that prevailed in
China this was easy.
Through skillful manipulation, both by Chinese and
by Japanese there coalesced in north China a group of
the more unscrupulous so called warloards and their
236
associates. This group became known as the Anfu Club.
The mechanism for exerting influence was found in Jap-
anese loans (the Nishihara loans). Their total amount and
exact purpose were never accurately known, but they were
estimated at $150,000,000. What was more serious was
that as security for the loans Japan was beginning to get
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a mortgage on China's communications and natural re-
sources, and would have succeeded in foreclosure on
them had events outside the Far East failed to impose
237
a check.
For a period of a year or two, however, the de-
ciding voice in China's internal political affairs was
Japanese, not Chinese. With the signing of these
treaties the negotiations ended, but the incident was
not closed.
From the outbreak of the war to the Versailles
treaty of 1919, Japan's wartime foreign policy remained
constant. Having successfully concluded its negotiations
with China, Japan now turned to the West to obtain a
closer understanding with the leading Allied and assoc-
iated powers and with the United States. Negotiations
were first started with Russia. These resulted in a
secret treaty being concluded in July, 1916, whereby the
signatories formed a defensive alliance to protect their
"vital interests" in China. They agreed to protect China
from domination by a third power hostile to them. Thus
Japan had assurances of Russia's assistance in preventing
third-power interference with the special rights secured
through the Twenty-One Demands. The United States was
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the only country in a position to protest effectively
against the 1915 agreements, since they affected its
treaty rights in China. It did make a formal diplo-
matic statement of its attitude, but went no further in
the way of protest.
Even before the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia was
to annul the benefits which might have been derived from
this treaty, negotiations were begun with Great Britain
for support of Japan's war claims. On January 27, 1917,
the two governments exchanged views on a secret treaty
in which each hoped to gain concessions from the other.
The British sought support for their claims to the former
German islands in the Pacific, south of the equator.
Since Germany had announced its resumption of unrestricted
submarine warfare a few days after the negotiations began,
the Allies were anxious to receive both logistical and
naval escort support from Japan for Atlantic and Med-
239iterranean convoys.
In April, 1917, the United States went to war with
Germany, and one of its first acts was to begin pressure
on China to join the Allies. Just why has never been
completely understood. It may have been natural Amer-
ican exuberance, or it may have been the belief that there
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was an advantage to having China represented at the
peace table, where the issue between itself and Japan,
growing out of Japan's wartime acts, could be brought
to judgment. At any rate, Americans in Peking, both
diplomatic and unofficial, began a whirlwind campaign
of persuasion in the best manner of Washington, D.C.
240lobbying. Furthermore, the Allies were hopeful
that Japan would be able to persuade China to break off
diplomatic relations with Germany.
In return for these services, Great Britain was
willing to support Japan's demands for the former German
rights in Shantung and to the Pacific Islands north of
the equator o Despite Japan's refusal to comply with all
of the Allies' requests, the British Government agreed
on February 16, 1917, to:
o o •• o support Japan's claims in regards to the
disposal of Germany's rights in Shantung and
possessions in islands north of the Equator at
the Peace Conference, it being understood that
the Japanese Government will treat in the same
spirit Great Britain's claims to German islands
south of the Equator. 24-1
At the same time France agreed to support the Japanese
claims on the condition that Japan would encourage the
movement in China toward joining in the war on the Allied
side. Italy entered into a similar agreement. All of
these agreements, made in 1917 before the entrance of the
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United States into the war, were kept officially secret
until the peace conference.
They were made the more necessary because of the
outbreak of revolution in Russia in March, 1917, for
Japan had attempted to safeguard its position by agree-
ment in the summer of 1916 with the Czar's government,
when the two states entered into a firm alliance for
the published purpose of preserving the peace of the Far
East, but, by secret protocols, with a view to delimiting
their respective interests in Eastern Asia and to cooper-
ating in their maintenance against any attack whatsoever
In this delimitation of their interests, Russia recognized
the changes made in the status quo by the Japanese 1915
Agreements with China and accepted them as necessary of
protection under the alliance, while Japan recognized the
Russian advance into Cuter Mongolia during the years
1912-1915. 242
China entered the war, but did so in ignorance of the
most vital consideration affecting its decision: its
position at the peace conference.
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D. The Lansing- Ishii Agreement
In 1917, the prospects for Japanese freedom of action
in China were better than ever. The distress of western
Europe brought calls for Chinese participation from
the Allied side, a participation encouraged by European
belligerents in the hopes of access to Chinese food and
manpower. In the end, China contributed a small army
of laborers to the western front. For the Anfu generals,
participation in the war seemed to promise access to
capital and munitions, both desperately needed, and a
seat at the conference that would decide disposition of
the German assets the Twenty- One Demands had transferred
243
to Japan,
Terauchi and his advisers talked of a 3 ino-Japanese
military alliance that would secure the northern border
against the Communist infection that followed the rev-
olution in Siberia, China needed all the aid it could
get, but only Japan stood ready to lend and direct.
Japan was a capital surplus nation for the first time
during World War I. Naturally, Japan expected to play




Terauchi had several aims. Cne was to secure
American acknowledgment of Japan's position in China.
The Lansing- Ishii notes, signed and released in November
1917 (and eliminated by negotiations only in 1932)
seemed to serve this purpose.244
The note reaffirmed the adherence of the two powers
to the classic formulas of the Cpen Door and the integrity
of China. It later developed that the United States
understood one thing and Japan another by this recognition
of its special interests. In a secret protocol, Lansing
sought to restrain Japan by getting it to agree not to
".....take advantage of present conditions to seek special
rights or privileges in China which would abridge the
rights of citizens or subjects of other friendly states".245
The prestige of the United States in the Far East
was far from enhanced by the exchange of the Lansing
-
Ishii notes; study of the documents, nevertheless, makes
clear that, in negotiating them, the Wilson administration
was attempting to weaken the effects upon China of the
Twenty-One Demands and the ensuing treaties. The notes
were finally cancelled on April 14, 1932, consequent upon
the signing of the Nine-Power Treaty of Washington.246
Decision having apparently been reached that negative
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morality, displayed by withdrawal from the Six-Power
Group of bankers in 1913, was not sufficient for the pro-
tection of China, steps were then taken to form a new
consortium which should have prevented continued de-
velopment of sphere- of-interest diplomacy in China. 247
On November 2, 1917, the Lansing- Ishii Agreement
was signed. It stated that neither country would in-
fringe on the independence or territorial integrity of
China, that both would adhere to the Open Door and to
equal opportunity for commerce and industry in China,
and that neither would take advantage of China's current
condition to obtain special rights or privileges which
would abridge those of citizens of other states. Further-
more, the United States recognized that "territorial
propinquity creates special relations between countries";
hence Japan had special interests in China, especially
in those areas contiguous to Japanese possessions. 248
This agreement was concluded without consultation
with, or even the knowledge of, the United States Min-
ister to China, Dr. Paul S. Reinsch who, to his chagrin,
learned of it through the Japanese Minister in Peking.
Minister Reinsch alleged that he did his best to soften
its effect by sanctioning in the Chinese translation the
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use of the term "special relations" rather than "special
interests." The Japanese, however, insisted on the
stronger translation, and at once, through their official
spokesmen and the press, demonstrated that they intended
249
to take full advantage of it.
Viscount Ishii said: "Because Lansing's
wife was the daughter of John Foster, ex-Sec-
retary of State and, later advisor to the
government of China, he made every effort to
defend China, to assist his father- in- law B
Thus, we experienced a great deal of incon-
venience and difficulty in the negotiations
on the problem of China. There existed a
wide gulf between us when we unbosomed our-
selves. We often had stormy debates which
jeopardized the conclusion of the agreement,
since from the outset we agreed to have heart
talks. However, at the next meeting, after
he reported to the President on the progress
of the negotiations, we were surprised to
find him softened and compromising in his
opinion. It seems that President Wilson made
a comparative study of the arguments of both
sides, and when he thought our argument just,
he adopted it unconditionally and urged the
Secretary of State to recognize it. We al-
ways felt as if we were negotiating with
President Wilson instead of Secretary of State
Lansing. But for President Wilson, the neg-
otiations would surely have ended in failure,
(from the Gaiko Yoroku by Ishii Kakujiro,
pp. 148-49) 250
By means of demands served on China, supplemented by
the threat of interference in the internal political
struggle in China and by actual interference, Japan
established hegemony on the continent. Then, through
153

successive agreements with Russia, England, France,
Italy, and the United States, sought largely because of
war necessity, it safeguarded its supremacy against
u 251attacks from the outside world.
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£• The Siberian Expedition
The rapid successes of the Russian Revolution and
the crumbling of the eastern front in Europe led to
3ritish speculation as to the advisability of asking
Japan to intervene in Siberia.
In the fall of 1917, the General Staff of the
Japanese Imperial Army had already made a careful es-
timate of the problems involved. It concluded that
logistic difficulties made it unwise to undertake a
major effort on the eastern front. Consequently, Japan
agreed with the United States that force should not be
used to intervene in Russia against the Bolsheviks.
The Imperial Army urged, just as Nishihara had recommended,
that efforts be concentrated on securing political and
economic supremacy in China through the exploitation of
2 52
natural resources.
Soon after the Communists took control in Russia,
the problem arose of what to do with 50,000 Czech troops
who had deserted the Austrian army and had joined the
Russian forces. When the Russian army disintegrated, the
Czech government with headquarters in Paris, had started
to move eastward across Siberia. It was the intention
15!

to evacuate them from Siberia and to bring them to
Europe to be incorporated into the French army; Moscow
agreed. As they made their way across Siberia through
the prevailing unrest, they were forced to periodically
fight their way through one band or another. They found
themselves most often being attached by Bolshevik de-
tachments. This led to a demand that they be rescued
2 e: >from the Communists.
There were hundreds of thousands of Austrian and
German prisoners in Russian prison camps, both in
European Russia and in Siberia. It was rumored among the
Allies that they had been let out of the prison camps,
(true); and that they were being armed by the Bolsheviks,
(false). This was offered as another reason for inter-
vening in Siberia, though whether it was really believed
by the British and French has always been subject to
doubt. A third reason for intervention was that in
Vladivostok there existed a quantity of arms and military
supplies that had been sent by the Allies when it was
still thought the Russians would and could resist Germany.
It was urged that these supplies be kept from falling into




The early Japanese attitude toward intervention was
expressed officially by 3aron Goto, the Japanese Min-
ister for Foreign Affairs, on May 1, 1918, when he said
that "Japan must give encouragement, assistance and
support to the work of reorganization" in Russia, and
that it must continue to assume the burden of "preser-
ving the peace in the Far East." His government, with
the concurrence of Great Britain and France, then pro-
posed to the United States that Japanese troops should
be sent to Vladivostok to protect the interests of the
2 5 5Allied states.
It was one thing for the Army to decline to par-
ticipate in a campaign in European Russia and quite an-
other for it to refrain from taking advantage of the
Bolshevik Revolution to improve Japan's position in
Eastern Siberia or in Northern Manchuria. Furthermore,
nearly three-quarters of a million tons of Allied war
material had accumulated at Vladivostok and would be a
valuable prize. In the hands of an army unfriendly to
China or to Japan, these supplies might be a decisive
2 5 6factor in the future peace of east Asia.
Britain, America, and France sent contingents of
7,000 men each, but the Japanese being nearer at hand,
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and having their own objective of guarding against the
establishment of a Bolshevik regime in such proximity
to Manchuria and Korea, sent no less than 70,000. It
was largely due to anxiety concerning Bolshevik inten-
tions that only a few months previously Japan had
entered into a military agreement with the Chinese War
Office and had undertaken to assist China in the event
of a threat to her frontiers from Soviet Russia, When,
therefore, the intervention took place, the Japanese
invoked this agreement for the purpose of taking control
of the Chinese Eastern Railway and using it to transport
257troops to the Baikal area and beyond.
After Japan had rejected outright a British sugges-
tion that the United States be asked to protect nearly
three-quarter of a million tons of Allied war material,
the British Cabinet decided to send a cruiser from Hong
Kong to Vladivostok to protect the Allied munitions.
When Japan learned of this move, it immediately dispatched
two warships to Vladivostok for the avowed purpose of
maintaining peace and order and protecting the foreign
consular corps. One of the ships arrived on
January 12, 1918, to be joined two days later by the
British cruiser from Hong Kong. In April, after the
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theft of Japanese property and the shooting of three
2 53Japanese, their marines were landed.
In Japan, Saionji and Hara were willing to send
troops only if the United States did so as well. Yamagata
and Terauchi favored intervention to get control of the
Trans-Siberian Railway and to thereby strengthen Japan's
position in Manchuria.
General Tanaka and other army officers had even more
grandiose dreams of a Siberian empire, as far west as
Lake Baikal, under Japanese influence. These opposing
factions were balanced for a time. Then American troops
were sent and the Allies invited Japan to participate.
In Japan the decision went to those who favored interven-
tion. 259 The expedition became a military rather than a
civil matter. The General Staff took advantage of its
"autonomy of command " and sent in many times the number
of troops originally agreed upon.
When the war ended, other nations withdrew their
troops. The United States hinted that Japan should do
the same, and Prime Minister Hara succeeded in getting
Yamagata' s support for a withdrawal of the Japanese
forces. The army, however, was no longer in the hands
of officers who felt loyalty to Yamagata. Moreover,
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it held that its honor was involved, and therefore
refused. In Japan the campaign became grossly unpop-
ular. It cost two thirds as much as the Russo-Japanese
War, and in the end nothing was gained. One music hall
comedian amused his audience by punning that the Siberia
shuppei (sending of troops) had become the Siberia
shippai (failure); and a general going to take his
command wore civilian clothes so as to travel unnoticed.
This was the first clear case in modern Japanese foreign
policy of autonmous action by the military as a refractory
T«- 260elite.
The Siberian Expedition is a fascinating case study
of how the General Staff achieved its objectives in the
face of strong national and international opposition. It
is equally important as an illustration of power politics
at work. Although there were small contingents of Allied
forces in Vladivostok and although the Tran-Siberian
Railway was jointly operated, control of the hinterland
was in Japanese hands. This situation continued through-
out the months of discussion on the peace settlement in
Paris. When the issues of racial equality, of Japanese
rights in Shantung, and of the Twenty-One Demands were




ched from Vladivostok to Harbin to China to Baikal.
The constant realization that the Japanese might remain
permanently in that huge area of Siberia acted as a strong
incentive to persuade the Allies to accept Japan's de-
mands in Paris. As is so often true in international
negotiations, the choice before the Allies was not be-
tween a good or bad solution, but rather among the least
objectionable of several unpleasant alternatives.
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F. Expectations from the Paris Peace Conference
On November 11, 1918, when the Armistice was signed
Japan viewed the cessation of hostilities with a far
more detached attitude than any of the other belligerents.
Internationally, Japan was in a strong position to press
for acceptance of its demands at the Peace Conference.
The Japanese army was rapidly spreading westward through
Siberia to Lake Baikal and northward into the Amur Valley;
the international character of the Siberian Expedition
6\
had little effect on retarding this advance. * No inter-
national agreement had yet been reached for the control
of international investments in China, so Japan still
operated there with a free hand.
In Tokyo, it was taken for granted that the Paris
Peace Conference would legalize the promises of the
Allies set forth in the Secret Treaties. They had promised
that the German possessions in Shantung and the Pacific
O r "3
Islands north of the equator would be ceded to Japan.
Japan also assumed that it would be free to negotiate
bilaterally with China on all outstanding issues and that
the latter would play only a minor part in the peace
negotiations. They accepted the concepts of the League
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of Nations and anticipated that the negotiations con-
cerning it would provide an excellent opportunity for
the Asiatic countries to seek recognition of both the
principle and practice of racial equality.
On January 15, 1919, three days after the Paris
Peace Conference was formally opened, Tokyo's leading
daily newspaper, the Asahi , editorialized that racial
inequality was the real obstacle in the way of the brother-
hood of nations and that Japan should represent the colored
races of the world in seeking equality. 4
The Japanese delegates had been instructed to make
efforts to secure adequate assurances against disadvan-
tages coming from racial prejudice when the League pro-
gressed to the point of nations making concrete proposals
for the League Covenant. Japan had racial equality,
but on this point it suffered a defeat. It had asked,
as part of the new order of relations between states
then being promulgated, a declaration of equality between
the races regardless of color. This did not arise out
of any concern for abstract idealism. It had a concrete




For more than ten years the question of Japanese
immigration into the United States had been a sore
point between the two countries, at times taking on a
threatening aspect. Alarmed at the swarming of Japanese
peasants into the states on the Pacific seaboard, those
states began to clamor for exclusion of Japanese, as
earlier they had called, successfully, for Chinese ex-
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elusion.
The Japanese maintained that they wanted only a
declaration of principle to vindicate their honor, and
disclaimed any intention of asking concrete application
of the principle. But the Americans, and even more the
Australians, feared that the Japanese would later use
the principle as the basis for equal rights of immigration
anywhere, a claim it would be difficult to deny without
inconsistency. This issue too, was disputed with ac-
rimony, but the Americans were firm and the Australians
intransigent, in conformity with the rigid "White
Australia" policy.
It would have been better for both East and West if
the United States had been more uncompromising on Shan-
tung and more conciliatory on racial equality. The
Japanese were to make skillful use of the refusal of
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other lands to admit their immigrants to justify their
expansion on the Asian continent. By the criterion of
supranational and abstract morality, if there is such
a thing, America was in the wrong, certainly at fault
in its manners; but so far as Japan's international
policy and action were concerned, the immigration ques-
tion was only an instrument of propaganda to be wielded
among its own people. It was so wielded, and wielded
successfully. It helped convince a large part of the
2 c q
Japanese people that expansion by force was justified.
The peace conference was an interlude for the Far
East; a postponement of thorny issues, if not an evasion.
The content and spirit of the settlement for that part
of the world rankled on all sides, and between Japan and
the United States relations became increasingly strained,
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at times so much so that war was not out of the question.
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VIII. The Washington Conference and its Aftermath
1919-1931
While Japan's conduct at Versailles may be properly
described as "successful , " at the Washington Conference,
held November, 1922, to February, 1932, it was unable
to maintain its new position.
The treaties negotiated at the Washington Conference
recognized and guaranteed Japanese naval hegemony in the
western Pacific, as well as Japan's extensive rights and
privileges on the mainland. For this reason, it was
possible for the first time to base Japan's diplomatic
and military policies on the principle of cooperation
with the Anglo-American nations. There emerged in Japan
a concept of "national defense" that placed a premium
on armament control and adherence to the treaties produced
at the Washington Conference. Throughout the 19 2 0s,
armament control and the preservation of existing rights
via diplomacy characterized the Japanese government.
In China, the nationalist movement of the Kuomintang
raised difficult questions. Should Japan assist this
movement and seek to protect its long-term continental
interests by friendly relations with a new central govern-
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ment; or should Japan safeguard its privileges by a
reliance on military power? In 1927 the Tanaka cabinet
formulated a basic policy guide which designated Man-
churia as a "special region" in which the government
must be ready to resist any encroachments on Japan's
position. Following this resolution, especially within
the army, there was an increasing desire for positive
action that would isolate Manchuria from the rest of
China. This approach was, however, shelved under the
Hamaguchi cabinet decision denying the premise that
Manchuria could be divorced from Japan's polices vis-
• nu- j» 4.1, 270a-vis China and the powers.
Japan explained its reasons for excluding south
Manchuria and eastern Inner Mongolia as follows: (1)
Japan not only had close relations with south Manchuria
and eastern Inner Mongolia politically and economically,
but the enterprises established in the said regions
affected the vital question of Japan's national defense;
(2) since any infiltration of Russian influence detri-
mental to Japan would be by way of Manchuria and Mongolia,
the latter ' s interests in the said regions were a matter
of life or death; (3) consequently, Japan's vital inter-
ests in south Manchuria and eastern Inner Mongolia were
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Both Great Britain and the United States expressed
their disapproval of Japan's "formula" concerning the
reservation of Manchuria and Mongolia, claiming that
Japan's intent was to acquire economic monopoly at the
expense of the interests of other powers, or was an
attempt to establish a territorial division as a sphere
of influence based on political exclusivism. After
patient point-by-point negotiations, an understanding
was finally reached with regard to the following points:
(1) the South Manchuria Railway and its existing branches,
together with their subsidiary mines, did not come within
the scope of the Consortium; (2) the projected Taonan-
Jehol Railway and the projected railway connecting a
point on the Taonan-Jehol Railway with a seaport were to
be included within the terms of the Consortium Agreement;
(3) the Kirin-Hoeryong, the Cheng-Chiatun-Taonan, the
Changchun-Taonan, the Kaiyuan-Kirin, the Kirin-Changchun,
the Shinminfu-Mukden and the Ssupignkai-Chengchiatun





Thus, while unsuccessful in inserting into the
final Consortium Agreement a specific clause that would
reserve its special interests in South Manchuria and in
Eastern Inner Mongolia, Japan did receive vague assur-
ances from the United States, Great Britain, and France
that they would not countenance operations inimical to
Japanese interests in Manchuria and Mongolia. These
general understandings finally cleared the way for the
formal signing of the Consortium Agreement, which took
27 3
place in Paris on October 15, 1920.
If the proposition for the formation of a new inter-
national banking consortium was designed to check Japan's
financial and economic advances in the Far East, it can
be assumed that the Washington Conference was aimed at
preventing Japan's political and military expansion in
the area. The Conference itself marked the first step
in the reorientation of Japan's foreign policy in the
Pacific, especially in the Far East.
From the standpoint of Japan's continental policy,
the Washington Conference achieved such significant re-
sults as the Nine- Power Treaty, the solutions of the
questions of Shantung's restoration, the Twenty-One
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Demands, and China's full tariff autonomy.
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Japan agreed to restore to China the former German
Leased territory of Kiaochow within six months after the
Treaty came into force, and in addition pledged to with-
draw the Japanese guards at Tsingtao within thirty days
and the Japanese troops along the Kiaochow- Tsinan Rail-
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way within six months.
China, on the other hand, took active steps to
nullify the so-called Twenty-One Demands, including the
restoration of Port Arthur, Dairen, and the South Man-
churia Railway in 1923, the year of the termination of
the lease by the earlier stipulations of the Treaties of
1915. Ku Wei-chin, the Chinese representative, went
further to maintain the invalidity of foreign settlements
and to insist on their retrocessions before the time
limit, while Dr. C. T. Wang, singling out the Sino-
Japanese Treaties and Notes of 1915, urged that the
Treaties and Notes be reconsidered and nullified.
The Japanese delegate, Masanao Kanihara, clearly
informed the Chinese delegation that Japan had no inten-
tion whatever of abandoning "the important rights which
Japan acquired and maintained legally, justifiably and
2 7 fi
at tremendously heavy sacrifices." Nevertheless,
recognizing the necessity of compromising to some extent,
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the Japanese Government delegate Kijuro Shidehara, on
February 2, L922, the day following the publication of
the Shantung Treaty , declared that Japan would vol-
untarily renounce the following interests stipulated in
the Sino-Japanese Treaties and Notes of 1915:
1. The loan for railway construction in South
Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, as well as the
right of priority for loan guaranteed by various taxes
as security.
2. Priority rights for employment of advisors
and instructors in South Manchuria,
3. The reservation made for future negotiations
on the draft of Group V.
The Japanese Government took another step on Feb-
ruary 6, 1922, by participating in the signing of the
Nine-Power Customs Convention. Under the Nine Power
Treaty, the contracting powers committed themselves to
the somewhat antithetical principles of respecting the
"territorial and administrative integrity" of China and
of maintaining the "principle of equal opportunity for the
27 7
commerce and industry of all nations" throughout China.
These treaties marked a successful adjustment of the
major problems of the Pacific region. From the Japanese
standpoint, they achieved the primary objectives of the
imperial government, including those of the Navy General
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Staff: Japan's home waters were secured from foreign
danger; the ability and right of the navy to protect
Japanese nationals on the mainland remained unchallenged;
and the vexing prospect of an armament race had been
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avoided.
After the Washington Conference, the main plank of
Japan's continental policy towards China was the ex-
ecution of the letter and spirit of the Conference agree-
ments and resolutions. Popularly known as the "Shidehara
Policy", the four principles as enunciated in the Diet on
January 18, 1927, by Foreign Minister 3aron Kijuro
Shidehara may be summarized as follows:
1. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of China, and the scrupulous avoidance of all
interference in its domestic conflicts.
2. The promotion of solidarity and economic rap-
prochement between the two nations.
3. A show of sympathy and benevolence for the just
efforts made to realize the declared aspirations.
4. The maintainance of an attitude of patience and
tolerance toward China's present situation and, at the same
time, the protection of Japan's legitimate and essential






It is undeniable that tensions between China and
Japan eased as a result of Shidehara's declaration and
that the feelings of distrust and suspicion by the
Western powers towards Japan's foreign policy also began
to subside. China's attempts to take advantage of
Japan's soft and cooperative policy resulted in frequent
and unjust trampling of Japanese interests. This in-
creasingly aggressive attitude by China towards Japan
naturally fostered the growth of much discontent in
2&G
Japan,
When the Hamaguchi Cabinet came to power, Baron
Shidehara, who again assumed the position of Foreign Min-
ister, attempted to continue his peaceful and cooperative
policy towards China. His tenure was interrupted by the
occurance of the Manchurian Incident on September 18, 1931,
said to have been caused by the blasting of the South Man-
churia Railway at Liu Tiao Kou by Chinese troops.
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Ao Tanaka's Aggressive Foreign Policy
Prime Minister Tanaka Giichi has earned himself a
place in history as the epitome of Japanese militarism. 2ai
When he became Premier, he lost no time in reversing the
conciliatory policy of the former cabinet. He retained
the portfolio of Foreign Minister for himself. He was
convinced that the threatened unification of China under
Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang and recent events in
Manchuria were a direct challenge to Japan.
When Chiang crossed the Yangtze River in a contin-
uation of his northern expedition in his unification
campaign, Tanaka's military and civilian advisers urged
positive action by Japan before Chiang and his Kuomintang
were victorious. One of Tanaka's most influential ad-
visers was Mori Kaku, Assistant Chief of the Political
Affairs bureau of the Foreign Office and a resident in
China for many years. During a trip to China early in
1927, he became convinced that Japan should counteract the
strong communist influence in China by aggressive action.
He was a major influence on Tanaka in carrying out such
. . 2a2
a policy.
One month after he became Prime Minister, Tanaka
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dispatched 2,000 Japanese troops from Manchuria to
Tsingtao in Shantung Province to interrupt Chiang Kai-
shek's advance. A direct clash between the Chinese and
Japanese troops was avoided, and Chiang Kai-shek tem-
porarily withdrew from public life. He went to Tokyo
and visited Prime Minister Tanaka with Mori Kaku in
attendance. Chiang proposed that China recognize
Japan's rights and interests in Manchuria in exchange
for Japan's recognition of a united China under his
leadership of the anticommunist Kuomintang. Although
there is evidence that Tanaka was intrigued with this
proposal, he refused to make a deal. Chiang's subsequent
success in launching a second northern expedition and
threatening Tsinan, the capital of Shantung, made
Tanaka decide in April, 1928 to dispatch more troops to
«. . 2 8 3China.
Minor clashes occurred between the Chinese and
Japanese armies in early May. Faced with superior Jap-
anese forces, Chiang Kai-shek withdrew his troops and
headed northward. When the Chinese commander in Shan-
tung refused to surrender, the reinforced Japanese troops
bombarded Tsinan killing an estimated 3,600 Chinese.
These actions, which were condoned by the cabinet, created
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the opposite results from those Tanaka had expected.
The bombardment of Tsinan brought world condemnation
for the atrocity.
The bombardment of Tsinan increased the effective-
ness of the Chinese boycott of Japanese goods. It con-
vinced Chiang Kai-shek that Japan was his enemy, and he
continued his march toward Peking. Having failed in
their mission to keep Chiang from proceeding to Peking,
Tanaka reluctantly ordered the Japanese troops to leave
Shantung
.
Tanaka 1 s plans for Manchuria became a partial victim
of his action in Shantung. He is credited with reversing
the Shidehara diplomacy, with setting Japan on a course
of continental aggression, and with articulating the
rationale for this with the "Tanaka Memorial" in which
he charted Japan's steps toward war.
On its own initiative the Kwantung Army had dis-
patched troops to the border of China proper and had
wanted to establish a puppet governor in Manchuria com-
pletely friendly to Japan, presumably not under Chang
Tso-lin. In the meantime, Colonel Komoto Daisaku had
plotted to assassinate Chang Tso-lin, hoping that this
would precipitate general disorder throughout Manchuria
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and offering an excuse for the Kwantung Army to take it
2&4
over. On June 4, 1928, as Chang was returning to
Mukden from Peking, and at the spot where his train
crossed the tracks of the South Manchurian Railway, his
2 8 5
special coach was bombed. Since one of the chief re-
sponsibilities of the Kwantung Army was the protection
of the South Manchurian Railway zone and even though
Tanaka and Japanese military leaders publicly disclaimed
any responsibility for the incident, the implication
was clear. Chang must have been murdered on orders
from someone within the Kwantung headquarters.
Tanaka 1 s attempts to live up to his campaign prop-
aganda thus "introduced new elements in Sino-Japanese
relations not in the field of policy but in policy
execution". The army units suceeded in diverting Tanaka f s
diplomacy, and once they were involved, a predictable
escalation of language and prestige brought the army
commanders the backing of their fellows in the General
Staff and War Ministery. Next, Manchuria was drawn into
the maelstrom of party and power politics in both Nanking
and Tokyo, This time the agents of change were in the
2 8 6
Japanese military establishment in Manchuria.
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Bo The Tanaka Memorial
Crowded onto a small group of islands, Japan's tra-
ditional ambition has been territorial expansion, and
Korea and China were aware of it. For the peace of the
Far East they had their own traditional policy, which
was to keep the islanders on their own islands. Japan's
repeated invasions of Korea as first steps toward the
conquest of the mainland of Asia met with failure.
The last and most destructive war of Hideyoshi, 'feie
Napoleon of Japan, "had occured in 1592. Although com-
pletely defeated by the Sino-Korean allied armies, the
war left Korea so helplessly devastated that it never
completely recovered. From then until 1876 the isolation
of Korea was so air-tight that not a Japanese or Chinese
was allowed to enter the country without special permit.
The Samurax warriors , though defeated and repulsed by the
allied troops of Korea and China after the Hideyoshi in-
vasion, never ceased to cherish their dream of 'world
conquest.' Their idea of the world never extended beyond
the continent of Asia, ^within the Four Seas."
The great victories they won were bound to have an
effect on the minds of the Japanese • They began to believe
178

that they were invincible. The nation was convinced that
so long as it was trained and equipped it could carry its
conquests into the r./est as well as in the East. Cut of
this national dream came into existence what was later
known as the Tanaka Memorial. The idea of world conquest,
as incorporated in that document, was by no means new.
It was the nation's hereditary ambition put into new
language, and with its scope widened. Baron Tanaka'
s
secret memorial was to Japan what Hitler's Mein Kampf
was to Germany. Both were written not as prophecies, pre-
dicting what would come to pass, but as military blueprints
for remapping the world.
3aron Tanaka knew that Japan had to move with
stealth until it was strong enough to come out in the open.
For that reason he kept the memorial secret. Cne copy
of the document was smuggled out of Japan and made public.
The American people were not prepared to accept it as the
revelation of Japan's military aims. Most Americans dis-
regarded it, just as most Europeans disregarded Hitler's
book.




"For settling the difficulties in Eastern Asia,
Japan must adopt a policy of iron and blood.... In
order to conquer the world, Japan must conquer Europe
and Asia; in order to conquer Europe and Asia, Japan
must conquer China.... In the future, if we wish to
control China, the primary move is to crush the
United States.... If we succeed in conquering China,
the rest of the Asiatic countries and the South Sea
countries will fear us and surrender to us...." 28
In the light of the 3 ino-Japanese conflict, it was all
too evident that the complete subjugation of China was
an integral part of Japan's design.
There is very little hard evidence to substantiate
these as Japan's aims, and not a scrap of evidence to
authenticate the so-called "Memorial," which became a
convenient item of anti-Japanese propaganda before and
during World War II. The document even became a subject
of anti-Tanaka and anti-Seiyukai propaganda within Japan
itself. Tanaka's reputation can best be understood as
the joint product of Japan's partial political demo-






The evidence shows that Japan was engaged in a Long-
term program to establish hegemony over Asia. To this
end it had reordered its entire national life from cradle
to grave.
Japan cultivated a spirit of militarism among its
people, and it indoctrinated them with the beliefs that
they were especially endowed by the Creator and that
unremitting allegiance to the Emperor, who was of divine
descent, was rewarded with a seat among the gods. It
was then impossible, from their point of view, for the
Jananese to brook interference with their haven-directed
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program.
Japan had begun to build an Asiatic empire at the
expense of China before World War I. China recognized
the impossibility of preventing its island neighbor from
extending control over the Ryukyu archipelago, south of
Kyushu, in 1881. From the Ryukyu islands the Japanese
were more fully able to appreciate the strategic value of
Formosa at the southern extremity of the chain. The
shaky control of the Manchu-Chinese government was elim-
inated completely after China's defeat in 1894-95. Through
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the Treaty of Shimoneseki, Formosa and the Pescadores
Islands, Located between China and southern Formosa, were
surrendered to Japan. Japan's gradual expansion into the
islands of the south brought its forces within a short
distance of the Chinese port of Amoy and the province of
Fukien
•
During the peace negotiations of 1895 Yanagata
wrote to a friend that the situation in the Far East
would grow worse and that Japan "must be prepared for
another war in ten years." The war with Russia came as
predicted, and from it Japan gained the southern half of
the island of Sakhalin, the recognition of Japan's par-
amount interests in Korea, the lease of the Liaotung Pen-
insula, and railway rights in southern Manchuria.
The second cornerstone of Japan's imperial structure
was laid when Korea was annexed in 1910. After protesting
for centuries that Korea was aimed by nature and human
malevolence as a dagger pointed at the heart of their
country, the Japanese were able in the twentieth century
to turn the dagger in the opposite direction. In the
period 1910-31, Korea was prepared as a base for further
continental expansion. Korean customs, institutions, and






Another aspect of this early phase of imperialism
was Japan's desire to get great-power credentials. The
great powers of the world had either empires or vast
internal territories under their control. Japan's
early concern for security quickly blossomed into a de-
sire for an empire as well. Yet, aware of its weaknesses,
Japan moved slowly from one limited objective to the next.
The Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 marked Japan's
recognition as a great Far Eastern power. Its victory,
however shaky, in the Russo-Japanese War confirmed this
fact, and by the time of Versailles, Japan was a world
power. Its empire had become less a needed symbol of
political prestige, and more an accepted part of the
Japanese body politic, integrated economically with the
home land
.
The economic dimension of this early phase of im-
perialism is hard to pin down. During the 1870 's and
1880 f s economic factors were minimal. By the turn of
the century they were more important, though difficult
to evaluate. Marxist historians in Japan have had
trouble explaining why early Japanese capitalism, still
blighted with feudal vestiges, should have manifested
the expansionist tendencies that "ought" only to appear
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in the most advanced capitalist nations, Cne explanation
suggested is that in Japan the shortage of capital,
rather than its surplus, led to imperialism and that
the Japanese, unable to compete with the West under
conditions of free competition, attempted to establish
protected zones on the continent to which Japanese
exports might be sent. Japanese businessmen did not
want expansion before 1905, they were not interested in
Manchuria, and they saw empire itself as unprofitable,,
Japan did need raw materials. During World War 1 the
zaibatsu encouraged the government in its demands for
iron, coal, and other raw materials from Manchuria and
China. Yet, at this time, raw materials were available
on the open market. Japan's economic development also
benefited from Japan's relatively large military expen-
292ditures.
In the area of ideology, a considerable number of
elements joined in support of imperialism. Cne en-
compassing element was the sanction of Japan's "pol-
itical religion." Before the formation of the consti-
tutional orthodoxy, very diverse positions were taken
regarding the emperor, and even after the turn of the




was rather broad. The title "emperor" for their ruler
is a misnomer. The Japanese do not call him "Emperor",
but "Tenno", the Heavenly King. They do not class him
with the emperors and kings of nations ; He is above them
all, a superior being. Even great Christian leaders
educated in the "/est, such as the late Inazo Nitobe
(1862-1933), declare the ruler of Japan is "the bodily
representative of Heaven and Earth." Every Japanese was
taught to believe he was more or less a god, because he
belongs to the divine Yamato race. Every child grew up
with the belief that: (1) Japan's Emperor was the only
divine ruler; (2) Japan was the only divine land; (3)
Japan's people were the only divine people and, therefore,
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Japan must be the light of the world. Yet, since the
emperor rather than the law or an abstract ethic was the
ultimate ground both of morality and of political legit-
imacy, the imperial mission of the emperor's army could
hardly be found morally wrong. Expansion did not need to
be justified as long as it was successful.
A second element coloring Japanese perceptions of
international relations was the lack of a tradition of
international law. Japan was not traditionally part of
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a multi- state international community Like that of the
European nations. Japan lacked the idea of a universal
law to which all nations might agree. Even their great
leaders educated in the West, such as the late Fukuzawa
Yukichi (1334-1901), felt that while law was useful in
dealing with the European nations, it was of little value
in Japan's relations with the rest of the world. And
even in relation to the West, in spite of his general
commitment to law, Fukuzawa early observed:
One hundred volumes of International Law
are not the equal of a few cannon; a hand-
ful of Treaties of Friendship are not worth
a basket of gunpowder. Cannon and gunpowder
are not aids for the enforcement of given
moral principles; they are the implements
for the creation of morality where none
exists. 295
This view was reinforced toward the end of the nineteenth
century by the impact of Social Darwinism. Spencer's
ideas on individualism aroused little interest, but the
ideas that the fittest societies not only survived but
conquered was readily accepted and joined to ideas re-
garding Japan's moral superiority.
A third ideological factor at this early stage was
the support given to Japans expansionism by the propon-
ents of constitutional government. For one thing, some
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in the political parties spoke of "Japan's Monroe
Doctrine." 296
Cn the face of it, the Japanese "Monroe Doctrine"
was designed to protect China against the imperialism
of the Western nations. For another, party politicians
had argued from the start that constitutional government
was strong government. Constitutional government and
colonial expansion were not seen as incompatible:
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England had both. Fukuzawa supported the 3 ino-Jap-
anese War as a means of advancing "modern civilization"
on the continent, and Ckuma violently criticized the
government for not getting more out of the Russo-Japanese
War.
Ties between party politicians and the Japanese
patriotic societies also grew out of this mixture. The
early doctrines of ultranationalist societies joined
liberalism and expansionsim; their members, therefore,
could go from the party movement to continental adven-
2 9 8tures with little sense of contradiction.
Some Japanese were aware that the era of imperial-
ism was passing. Yet most felt that, since Japan had
begun late, the powers, her allies, should not begrudge
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her a few more years of activity.
The last fling of this early phase of imperialism
stemming from decisions by a unified government, as well
as being the first presage of something new, was the
Siberian Expedition of 1918-22. Desirous of getting
Russia back into the war against Germany, the Allied
powers sent troops to Siberia. Yamagata and Terauchi
favored intervention to get control of the Trans-Siberian
Railway and to thereby strengthen Japan's position in
Manchuria. General Tanaka and other army officers had
even more grandiose dreams of a Siberian empire as far as
Lake Baikal, under Japanese influence. In Japan the
campaign became grossly unpopular. It cost two- thirds
as much as the Russo-Japanese "Jar, and in the end nothing
was gained.
The theory of the imperial will was thus a fatal
flaw in Japan's political structure, but the militarists
could not have exploited it so successfully had not the
armed forces enjoyed in practice considerable independence
from public control and autonomy within the government.
This was a serious constitutional flaw. Diet control
over the cabinet was never fully established even in the
13 8

1920's, because the Diet never won full control over the
purse strings . If the budget were rejected by the Diet,
the cabinet had the right to continue in force the
299budget of the preceding year.
The navy and army, moreover, maintained independence
from the cabinet by insisting that the Navy and Army
Ministers be active officers of high rank and therefore
subject to military discipline and available for service
in the cabinet only with army and navy approval • This
ruling, first made in 1895 and given imperial sanction
five years later, permitted the armed forces to destroy
cabinets or prevent undesirable leaders from talcing the
premiership simply by refusing to let any qualified
officers accept portfolios in the government a
The armed forces had thus not only established their
independence of the civil government but had rewon a
virtual veto power over the cabinet. The way was open
for any action the army wished to take.
The authoritarian state created the ideal conditions
for the mass acceptance of the ideals of militarism and
aggression that were held up before the Japanese people
by the leaders of modern Japan. The people accepted the
189

decisions for war and aggression that were made by the
narrow ruling oligarchy , and they accepted without
complaint the sacrifices that grew out of these decisions.
They accepted them not only because they had been forced
to do so and indoctrinated to do so, but also because they
were acting as their political traditions and their pol-
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